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INTRODUCTION

In 1950, at the end of a triumphant season with the Boston Braves,
outfielder Sam Jethroe earned Major League Baseball's National League
Rookie of the Year award.' Forty years later, Jethroe found himself
destitute with no home and without his Rookie of the Year trophy,
which he sold in desperation for money.2 A variety of factors conspired
to pull Jethroe into poverty, and one such factor was racially motivated
employment discrimination. As an African-American, Jethroe was
barred from playing Major League Baseball (MLB) for the majority of3
what would otherwise have been his most productive playing years.
Limited, as a consequence of his race, to three full seasons and one
partial season in the big leagues, Jethroe fell narrowly shy of the fouryear eligibility requirement for a Major League Baseball pension.4 With
no money and no other recourse, Jethroe sued Major League Baseball
and related entities in March of 1995 for the pension he felt he was
wrongly denied,5 but he gained no redress, as the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed the suit as
untimely. 6 With the dismissal, the case lost the little media attention it
initially attracted, and Jethroe receded into the obscurity in which he had
lived for years. He died several years later,7 and his suit has received
scarce attention since.
The obscurity of Jethroe's suit is, however, unfortunate. While on
first blush Jethroe's claim may seem a minor matter of one retired ballplayer's fight for supplemental income in his golden years, the basic
characteristics of Jethroe's suit-a claim for pension funds denied as a
consequence of past racial discrimination-present a uniquely powerful
claim for delayed racial justice. And as America continues to debate,
with increasing intensity, the merits of compensating people for
1. Brad Snyder, Jethroe Seeks Legal Victory in Bid for Baseball Pension, BALT. SUN, Apr. 22,

1995, at IC.
2. Eric Enders, So Long, Sam: Jethroe's Death Ends One of the Most Interesting Lives in
Baseball History, ERICENDERS.COM, June 20, 2001, http://www.ericenders.com/jethroe.htm.
3. Snyder, supra note 1, at 1C.
4. Lawsuit Dismissed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1996, at 13; Jethroe v. Major League Baseball

Props., Inc., No. 95-72, slip op. at 6 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 1996). After MLB players went on strike in
1981, MLB altered its vesting requirements such that the medical benefits requirement became one day
and the pension requirement became forty-three days. Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 751 n.4 (9th Cir.

2006).
5. Snyder, supra note 1, at IC.
6. Lawsuit Dismissed, supra note 4, at 13; Enders, supra note 2.
7. Richard Goldstein, Sam Jethroe is Dead at 83; Was Oldest Rookie of the Year, N.Y. TIMES,
June 19, 2001, at A21.

2008]

EXPLORING JETHROE'S INJUSTICE

decades- and centuries-old racial injustice through reparations and other
means, the characteristics of Jethroe's claim deserve a closer look.
Under analysis, Jethroe's claim avoids criticisms routinely launched
at claims for delayed racial justice. It thus presents a model for claims
potentially open to scores of people of color formerly employed in any
number of industries who, by virtue of racial discrimination suffered
during their working years, are deprived pension benefits in their later
years. Although Jethroe's particular claim failed, claims brought under
the same model, hereinafter "Jethroe claims," have the potential to
provide many former employees with restorative racial justice.
Part I of this Article explores Sam Jethroe's claim-examining his
attempts to play Major League baseball, his race-based rejection, and his
legal challenge to recover pension funds denied him as a consequence of
that racial discrimination-and raises the possibility of other retirees,
hereinafter "Jethroe claimants," bringing claims for denied pensions.
Part II analyzes the utility of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Section 1981) as a
mechanism for asserting Jethroe claims and concludes the statute is well
suited for such use. Part III examines Jethroe claims in light of the
recent movement for reparations in this country, noting the
inapplicability of traditional anti-reparations arguments to a claim of
delayed justice for pension denial. Part IV explores the policies
supporting statutes of limitations as well as the circumstances under
which the law disfavors statutes of limitations application and engages
the possibility that despite legal and policy arguments against timebarring Jethroe claims, the statutes of limitations defense, if pled, would
prevent adjudication on the merits and thus block the remedy such
adjudication would potentially yield. Recognizing this possibility, Part
IV explores whether (1) common law exceptions to statutes of
limitation, (2) legislative action, or (3) traditional notions of professional
responsibility might provide access to that remedy. Finally, Part V
concludes that Jethroe claims, if freed from statutes of limitations attack,
could serve to deliver long-denied justice to scores of retirees and, in
doing so, help to heal the festering wound of racial animosity that has
persisted in America for centuries.
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I. JETHROE'S INJUSTICE
8
"I gave baseball a lot more than it gave me."

A. DiscriminatoryDenial
Sam Jethroe was the son of a farmer and a domestic worker, and was
raised in East St. Louis, Illinois. 9 From his earliest days, Jethroe
exhibited tremendous athletic prowess. Known for his speed, he
excelled playing semi-pro baseball in East St. Louis, Illinois and St.
Louis, Missouri.' 0 Despite his unquestionable talent, however, Jethroe
was initially unable to play Major League Baseball because of his skin
color." Major League Baseball consists of two separate leagues, the
National League and the American League, which, since 1903, have
operated in tandem under a joint organizational structure. 12 Although
teams in both Leagues employed black players during the late 1880s,
members of some of the Leagues' fully segregated teams refused to play
against integrated teams, and eventually the Leagues' blacks were
expurgated. 13 Indeed, consequent to a "gentlemen's agreement" among
Major League owners, blacks would be barred from Major League play
until 1947.14
Without access to the Major Leagues, blacks organized among
themselves and created baseball leagues for black players, which would
come to be known as the Negro Leagues. 15 Like scores of other black
baseball players discriminatorily denied the opportunity to play Major
League ball, Jethroe played for years in the Negro Leagues. In 1942,
Jethroe joined the Cincinnati Buckeyes, and during his first year with the
team, his on-field success was unrivaled. 16 He led the Negro American
8. Enders, supra note 2 (quoting Sam Jethroe).
9. BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN SPORTS: BASEBALL 282 (David L. Porter ed.,

1987).
10. Id.
11. See Rich Marazzi, Batting the Breeze, SPORTS COLLECTORS DIGEST, Nov. 11, 1994, at 110.
12. THE BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA: THE COMPLETE AND DEFINITIVE RECORD OF MAJOR

LEAGUE BASEBALL 6 (Jeanine Bucek ed., 10th ed. 1996).
13. See PATRICK CLARK, SPORTS FIRSTS 12 (1981).
14. ROBERT PETERSON, ONLY THE BALL WAS WHITE, at v (1970); HOWARD BRYANT, SHUT
OUT: A STORY OF RACE AND BASEBALL IN BOSTON 24 (2002) ("The desire to keep blacks out of the
major leagues existed in great degree from the players all the way to the commissioner's office ....
").
15. PETERSON, supra note 14, at v. The most successful and renowned of these leagues was the
Negro National League, organized in 1920 by "the Father of Black Baseball," Rube Foster. WILLIAM C.
RHODEN, FORTY MILLION DOLLAR SLAVES: THE RISE, FALL, AND REDEMPTION OF THE BLACK
ATHLETE 100 (2006).

16. BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN SPORTS: BASEBALL, supra note 9, at 282. After
the 1942 season, the Buckeyes moved from Cincinnati to Cleveland. See id.
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League in batting average, runs scored, doubles, triples, stolen bases,
and base hits. 17 In 1944, Jethroe again led the League in batting average
and did so once more in 1945, when he led the Buckeyes to the Negro
League World Series.' 8 On the heels of his triumphant 1945 season, the
Boston Red Sox invited Jethroe-as well as Marvin Williams, who was
then starring for one of the Negro Leagues' most storied franchises, the
Philadelphia Stars, and future MLB great Jackie Robinson, who would
eventually be the first black player in the Majors-to their stadium,
Fenway Park, for what the club described as a tryout. 19 It was preordained, however, that none of the three would make the team. As then
Red Sox manager Joe Cronin has since said of the sham tryout, "I was in
no position to offer them a job. The general manager did the hiring and
there was an unwritten rule at that time against hiring black players.' 2 °
The empty tryout only came about, in fact, as the result of a political
compromise between the Red Sox and Boston councilman Isadore
Muchnick.2 1 Muchnick, whose constituency consisted of many blacks,
threatened the Red Sox that he would seek to ban Sunday baseball
games if they did not integrate.22 At the time, professional baseball
could only be played on Sundays in Boston by permit, and permit
issuance required a unanimous city council vote.2 3 Muchnick indicated
his intention to vote against issuance if the team did not offer black
players a tryout.24 The Red Sox were undaunted in their segregationist
view, but the team agreed to hold a tryout if it would placate
Muchnick.25 For this reason, and no other, Jethroe had his first Major
League tryout.26 During the following years, Jethroe continued to excel
17. Id.

18. Id.
19. BRYANT, supra note 14, at 31.

20. Id. at 32. Cronin's sentiments against integration may have been a great deal stronger.
Indeed, Clif Keane, a Boston Globe reporter at the time, said he heard the statement "[g]et those niggers
off the field" as Jethroe, Robinson, and Williams played. Id. Keane believed then-Red Sox owner, Tom
Yawkey, made the taunt, but it has also been attributed to Cronin as well as then-Red Sox General
Manager, Eddie Collins. Id.
21. Id. at 24-29.
22. Id. During an era before television broadcast revenue deals and before baseball games were
regularly played in the evening, gate receipts from weekend baseball games-which fans, free from
weekday employment obligations, could patronize-were of great financial import to teams. See id. at
29. To ban Sunday baseball, therefore, would have been a "potentially crippling blow." Id.
23. Id. at 24.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 29.
26. That the tryout was a complete sham was not lost on Jethroe, as his teammate with the
Buckeyes, Willie Grace, explained:
Sam told us what a joke that so-called tryout was ....He said you just knew it was a
farce because when the guys were out there Joe Cronin-who was managing the club-
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with the Buckeyes, 27 as well as in Cuba's winter baseball League,
where
28
years.
consecutive
two
in
bases
stolen
in
he led the League
In 1947, the Brooklyn Dodgers promoted Jackie Robinson from their
Montreal-based minor league team, which competed in the International
League, and officially desegregated the Major Leagues. 29 Robinson's
promotion did not "smash the color barrier" as is often suggested.
Rather, it created a crack in the barrier wide enough for a fortunate few
black players to squeeze through, but far too narrow to allow in all those
who were deserving. In 1947, five black players competed on three of
MLB's sixteen teams-the Brooklyn Dodgers, the Cleveland Indians,
and the St. Louis Browns. 30 In the following year, 1948, the Browns
resegregated and did not hire another black player for three years,
leaving the Dodgers and the Indians as the only MLB teams to employ
black players. 31 In 1949, the New York Giants employed two black
players, bringing the number of desegregated teams back to three and
the total number of black players in the Major Leagues to nine.3 2
B. Making the Majors
In 1950, the number of blacks in Major League Baseball remained
nine, a mere two percent of a League employing 400 players, 33 and
despite the long odds of being one of the few blacks permitted to play in
the League, Jethroe finally broke in. Two years earlier, the Dodgers
bought Jethroe's rights from the Buckeyes and sent him to play minor
league ball in Montreal, where Robinson previously played.34 Jethroe
met with great success in his first season playing with primarily white
teammates. During the 1948 season, Jethroe batted an impressive .322

didn't even bother to look. He was just up in the stands with his back turned most of the
time. He just sent some of his men out there and told them to throw some balls, hit some
balls to us ....
Id. at 32.
27. All told, in his six seasons with the Buckeyes, Jethroe compiled a remarkable batting average
of .342 and was selected to the play in the Negro Leagues' annual All-Star game in four of those
seasons. See Historic Baseball, http://www.historicbaseball.com/players/jljethroe-sam.html (last visited
Aug. 8, 2007).
28. BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN SPORTS: BASEBALL, supra note 9, at 282.
29. LARRY MOFFI & JONATHAN KRONSTADT, CROSSING THE LINE: BLACK MAJOR LEAGUERS,

1947-1959, at 1-2 (1994).
30. Id. at 11-25.
31. Id. at 13-14,23-36.
32. Id. at 15-47.
33. See id. at 47.
34. BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN SPORTS: BASEBALL, supra note 9, at 282.
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and stole 18 bases in 76 games. 35 His next season, however, was even
more remarkable. He raised his batting average to .326, hit 17 home
runs, led the League with 154 runs scored, and set an all-time
International League record by stealing 89 bases.36
Although Jethroe starred in the Negro Leagues and again in the
Dodgers' minor league organization in 1948 and 1949, during which
time he was arguably their best minor league player, the Dodgers had no
room for him. 37 They had reached their limit for black players. Indeed,
even the few teams deciding to employ black players were careful to
limit the number of black players on their rosters. 38 So, rather than
promote Jethroe to the Dodgers' major league club and add a fourth
black face to the team photo, the Dodgers sold him to the Boston Braves
in the spring of 1950. 39 Unable to look past his talent, the Braves, an
organization that had never previously employed a black player, took a
chance, bucking Major League tradition, and became only the fourth of
the sixteen MLB clubs to employ a black player.4 °
The Braves benefited mightily from their decision. Jethroe quickly
became the Braves' starting centerfield, proceeded to have an excellent
year, and won the National League's Rookie of the Year award.4'
Jethroe repeated his success in 1951.42 His production in 1952,
35. Id. A baseball player's batting average is a calculation of the player's successful base hits
divided by the player's at-bats (opportunities to produce base hits). Batting Statistics, MLB STATISTICS
GLOSSARY http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?page=stats/glossary (last visited, Dec. 11, 2007).
A batting average above .300 is considered good. See BERNIE WALTER, THE BASEBALL HANDBOOK
219 ("Baseball is the only field of endeavor where a [person] can succeed three times out often and is
considered a good performer.").
36. Id. at 282-83.
37. MOFFI & KRONSTADT, supra note 29, at 50.
38. See id. at 11-47 (revealing how few black players were employed by the various teams). For
years, American sports organizations "set artificial limits on the number of black athletes who would
make their teams." See RHODEN, supra note 15, at 161. Consider the observation of Frank Robinson, a
black man who played Major League Baseball from 1956 through 1976 and was later inducted into the
MLB Hall of Fame: "There was a quota on a lot of ball clubs .... If you saw a few [blacks] at spring
training at a major league camp and there was more than four, you said, 'Uh-uh, someone's got to go."'
BRAD SNYDER, A WELL-PAID SLAVE: CURT FLOOD'S FIGHT FOR FREE AGENCY IN PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS 52 (2006).
39. BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN SPORTS: BASEBALL, supra note 9, at 283.

40. See MOFFI & KRONSTADT, supra note 29, at 50-52. Jethroe's impact was immediate.
Recognizing that Dom DiMaggio was one of the Major Leagues' fastest players, Harold Kaese of the
Boston Globe explained that his speed was no match for Jethroe's, proclaiming that "Jethroe will out run
Dom DiMaggio by 15 or 20 yards in a hundred [yard dash]." Marazzi, supra note 11, at 110.
41. BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN SPORTS: BASEBALL, supra note 9, at 283.
During the season, Jethroe had a batting average of .273, hit 18 home runs and led the major leagues
with 35 stolen bases. Id. Jethroe's stolen base total dwarfed that of Dom DiMaggio, who led the
American League with a mere 15.
See THE BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA: THE COMPLETE AND
DEFINITIVE RECORD OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, supra note 12, at 964.

42. In 1951, Jethroe again hit 18 home runs and stole 35 bases, but increased his batting average
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however, did not match that of his previous two years. This was
certainly due, in part, to Jethroe's age. As a consequence of the
discrimination that barred him from entering the Majors earlier, as a
third year player in 1952, Jethroe was 35 years old, an advanced age for
an elite athlete.43 As an additional matter, the Braves changed managers
during the season, and the new manager, Charlie Grimm, apparently
hostile to African-Americans, alienated and marginalized Jethroe by
calling him "Sambo, ' '44 a racially derogatory term dating to the days of
chattel slavery.45 In the following year, 1953, the Braves traded Jethroe
to the Pittsburgh Pirates, where he played sparingly before being
demoted to the Pirates' minor league team in Toronto, where he played
until his retirement from baseball in 1958.46 As of Jethroe's demotion,
half of the Major Leagues' teams remained segregated, and the Leagues'
final segregated team-the same Boston Red Sox that staged the sham
1945 tryout for Jethroe, Sam Williams, and Jackie Robinson-did not
accept its first black player until halfway through the 1959 season.4 7
C. Life After Baseball
Jethroe's life in retirement was quiet. After leaving the game, he
opened a mildly successful Erie, Pennsylvania, dining establishment
called Jethroe's Bar and Restaurant.
Although not particularly
profitable, the restaurant served to help support a modest lifestyle for
Jethroe and his family for over thirty years. 48 In the early 1990s, Jethroe
was pressured to sell his restaurant to allow for construction of a

to .280. See BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN SPORTS: BASEBALL, supra note 9, at 283.

43. Marazzi, supra note 11, at 111.
44. Id.
45. See 14 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 426 (2d ed. 1989).

In spite of his age and his

manager's derision, in 1952, Jethroe hit a respectable 13 home runs and stole an impressive 28 bases,
but his batting average dropped to a career low .232. MOFFI & KRONSTADT, supra note 29, at 52.
46. BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN SPORTS: BASEBALL, supra note 9, at 283.
47. See MOFFI & KRONSTADT, supra note 29, at 212. The Red Sox commitment to segregation
is legendary. In addition to forfeiting opportunities to sign Jethroe and Robinson, the Red Sox, in 1949,
refused, on the basis of race, to sign "a young and already supremely talented Willie Mays, who would
go on to become arguably the best player in the history of baseball." N. Jeremi Duru, Fieldinga Team
for the Fans: The Societal Consequences and Title VII Implications of Race-Considered Roster
Construction in Professional Sport, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 375, 384 (2006) (citing Steve Fainaru, In
Racism's Shadow: Red Sox Working to Shed Longtime Image, but Blacks In and Out of Baseball Still
Uneasy, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 4, 1991, at 1). Indeed, the Red Sox epic World Series championship
drought, which lasted from 1918 through 2004 and was long attributed to a curse baseball great Babe
Ruth imposed upon the Red Sox after they sold his playing rights to the Yankees, might be more
appropriately attributed to the team's rejection of talent consequent to its long-standing bigoted
personnel decision-making. See id.at 395 n. 142.
48. Enders, supra note 2, at 1.
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municipal development project. 49 Intent on resurrecting Jethroe's Bar
and Restaurant, but fiscally constrained from purchasing in many
locations around Erie, Jethroe had little choice but to buy in one of
Erie's rougher areas. 50 Not long after re-launching his business, a man
was shot and mortally wounded in the restaurant. 51 The incident
frightened Jethroe's customers and potential customers, and business
suffered badly.5 2 With his business unable to generate income, Jethroe
fell into poverty and, desperate for cash, sold the Rookie of the Year
53
Trophy he earned some forty years earlier for a mere $3,500.
Coincidentally, and tragically, as Jethroe's finances unraveled, his
home burned to the ground.54 Homeless and impoverished, Jethroe
turned to living in his defunct restaurant.5 5 Aged, with no money, and
no job prospects, Jethroe found himself in the situation against which
employee retirement benefits are designed to protect.
Because,
however, Jethroe was denied an MLB pension, he gained no such
protection. Believing the denial to be the consequence of race-based
discrimination in employment, Jethroe,56 in March of 1995, filed a
federal suit against Major League Baseball and related entities.57
Alleging several violations of law, Jethroe sought, among other
remedies, compensation for the denied pension payments.58
Jethroe was correct in asserting that he was denied a pension many
other former MLB players received. In 1947, MLB initiated a pension
program for all retired players who logged four years in the League.

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Jethroe's wife, Elsie Jethroe, was also a named plaintiff in the suit, but her claims were
entirely derivative of his. See Jethroe v. Major League Baseball Props., Inc., No. 95-72, slip op. at I n.1
(W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 1996).
57. Id. at 3. Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint on April 21, 1995 and a second amended
complaint on October 16, 1995. Id. Also named in the lawsuit were the following: Major League
Baseball Properties, Canada, Inc.; The Players Relations Committee of Major League Baseball; The
Office of the Commissioner of Baseball; The American and National Leagues of Professional Baseball
Clubs and Their Member Clubs; The Major League Baseball Players Association; and the Major League
Pension Fund. Second Amended Complaint at 1,Jethroe v. Major League Baseball Props., Inc., No. 9572 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 1996).
58. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 57, at 1-5.
59. Robert A. McCormick, Baseball's Third Strike: The Triumph of Collective Bargaining in
Professional Baseball, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1131, 1147 (1982). See also Major League Baseball History,

Commissioners, Albert Benjamin "Happy" Chandler, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/history/mlb-historypeople.jsp?story=combio_2 (last visited Feb. 9, 2008).
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Jethroe, by his own admission, only played Major League baseball for
three full years and part of a fourth.60 Jethroe did not, however,
challenge the four-year requirement. Rather, he proceeded under several
theories, 61 arguing that although he did not play in the Major Leagues
for the requisite four years, his tenure was unlawfully restricted on the
basis of race, and that he was, therefore, entitled to the pension he would
have received absent the discrimination. 62 On September 30, 1996, after
significant motions practice, Judge Sean McLaughlin of the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissed
Jethroe's suit with prejudice, effectively ending Jethroe's fight for racial
justice in the courts.
Sam Jethroe died five years later, in June of
2001 .4
Although Jethroe was unable to prevail with his suit, he left behind
the skeletal model of a unique delayed racial justice claim deserving of
attention.

60. Jethroe,No. 95-72, slip op. at 6.
61. In addition to claiming violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the claim addressed at length in this
Article, Jethroe claimed violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution, the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Employment Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), various trademark laws,
and common law fraud doctrine. Id. at 2-3.
62. Id. at 6-7.
63. Jethroe filed an appeal with the Third Circuit, but shortly thereafter agreed to dismiss the
appeal. See Docket Sheet, Jethroe v. Major League Baseball Props., Inc., No. 95-72 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30,
1996) (showing appeal filing on October 29, 1996). In 1997, perhaps in response to equity concerns
raised by Jethroe's suit, Major League Baseball agreed to issue annual supplemental income payments
of between $7,500 and $10,000 to Negro League players who eventually entered the Major Leagues but
who did not play four years in the majors as well as those who never entered the majors but who played
four or more years in the Negro Leagues prior to 1947-the year Jackie Robinson entered the Major
Leagues. Enders, supra note 2, at 3; Editorial, 'Negro' Players Finally Get Their Due, TAMPA TRIB.,
May 18, 2004, at A8. This plan, of course, did nothing for the numerous players who were not
permitted to play Major League baseball "for many years after [1947] when in fact the [M]ajor
[L]eagues were not really integrated." Id. at A8. Due largely to the lobbying of Robert "Peach Head"
Mitchell, who pitched for the Negro Leagues' Kansas City Monarchs from 1954-1957, and United
States Senator Bill Nelson of Florida, the Major Leagues, in May of 2004, reached a second agreement
granting all Negro League players who played portions of at least four Negro League seasons after 1947
the option of receiving: (1) $833.33 per month for four years; or (2) $375 per month for life. Dan
Steinberg, MLB Agrees to Make Payments to Negro League Players,WASH. POST, May 15, 2004, at D9.
Notably, in 2003, a group of retired white players who played fewer than four MLB seasons
sued the Commissioner of Major League Baseball, Bud Selig, together with all Major League teams,
claiming that, by excluding them from MLB's 1997 Negro League player supplemental income plan as
well as a 1993 MLB medical coverage plan for former Negro League players, Major League Baseball
discriminated against them on the basis of race. Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 751-53 (9th Cir. 2006).
Finding the retired white players were not similarly situated with the Negro League players and that
MLB's reasons for issuing the supplemental income and medical plans were both legitimate and nondiscriminatory, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's summary judgment dismissal. Id. at 760.
64. See Goldstein, supra note 7, at A2 1.
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1981 AS A BASIS FOR JETHROE CLAIMS

A. Section 1981 's Origins
Section 1981 provides the most likely and obvious avenue for retirees
brining Jethroe claims. 65 Indeed, as much as any statute in our body of
laws, Section 1981 exists to protect people of color from discrimination.
About this, there can be no doubt. Section 1981 reads, in relevant part,
as follows:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
66
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens ....
Section 1981 finds its origins in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (the
1866 Act), enacted in the year following the Civil War's conclusion to
shield non-whites from race-based oppression. 67 As Senator Lyman
Trumball, then chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, explained
in introducing the legislation that would become the 1866 Act, it was
designed to strengthen the impact of the Thirteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. 68 That Amendment, which prohibits slavery
and involuntary servitude except as punishment for a crime, 69 was at the
time under assault throughout America's southern states by way of
legislatively enacted "Black Codes.,

70

The Black Codes served

essentially to re-institutionalize slavery on a state-by-state basis,

65. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would seem a similarly intuitive path to relief for
Jethroe claimants. The statute, however, was passed in July of 1964, became effective in July of 1965,
and prohibited retroactive use.

THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: THE PASSAGE OF THE LAW THAT

ENDED RACIAL SEGREGATION 361 (Robert D. Loevy ed., 1997); Patterson v. Am. Tobacco Co., 535
F.2d 257, 274 (4th Cir. 1976) ("Title VII is not retroactive."); Elinor P. Schroeder, Title VII at 40: A
Look Back, J. KAN. B. ASS'N, Nov./Dec. 2004, at 18, 22 (citing Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII
§ 716, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253) ("The effective date for Title VII was one year after enactment,
July 2, 1965.").
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000).
67. Angela M. Ford, Comment, Private Alienage Discrimination and the Reconstruction
Amendments: The Constitutionalityof 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 457, 460-62 (2001).
68. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, FROM CONFEDERATION TO NATION: THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION

1835-1877 191 (1973).
69. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
70. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 672 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), superseded by statute, Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Title Ill § 313(a), Pub. L.
No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5114 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)), as recognized in
Jones v. R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004).
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restricting blacks in seemingly innumerable ways. 71 For instance, Black
Codes typically prevented blacks from owning land, traveling without
passes, gathering together in even small numbers, living in certain areas,
owning firearms, speaking to whites without prescribed
deference, and
72
occupations.
and
professions
certain
in
engaging
While Congress was certainly concerned with all of these Black
Code-created deprivations in passing the 1866 Act, it was primarily
concerned with guaranteeing to blacks non-abridgment of their
economic rights.73 Specifically, the Act was aimed at actions taken to
promote black economic subservience following emancipation and, in
particular,
the
discriminatory
abridgement
of employment
opportunities.7 4 Indeed, "Congress clearly believed that freedom would
be empty for black men and women if they were not also assured an
equal opportunity to engage in business, to work, and to bargain for sale
of their labor., 75 Congressional debate and testimony presaging the
legislation's passage reveal as much. In advocating for what would
become Section I of the 1866 Act, legislators made clear that the section
was squarely about protecting economic rights and, specifically, the
right to work. For instance, Representative William Windom of
Minnesota stated the legislation's "object is to secure to a poor, weak
class of laborers the right to make contracts for their labor, the power to
enforce the payment of their wages, and the means of holding and
enjoying the proceeds of their toil."' 76 During further discussion on the
same legislation, Representative William Lawrence of Ohio also
advocated for its passage stating, "It is idle to say that a citizen shall
have the right to life, yet to deny him the right to labor, whereby alone
77
he can live."
B. Section 1981 's Scope
Few scholars question the 1866 Act's applicability to employment
rights, but some have questioned the 1866 Act's applicability to private,
as opposed to state-sponsored, discrimination. Scrutinizing the origins
of the 1866 Act, however, reveals that, from its inception, Section 1981
has indeed forbidden private discrimination. This is clear for several

71.

See id.

72. HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW 319 (1982).
73. Goodman, 482 U.S. at 674.
74. Id.

75. Id.
76. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1159 (1866).
77. Id. at 1833.
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reasons.
First, the plain language of the statute is unambiguous. Section I of
the Act of 1866, the precursor to what is currently Section 1981 and 42
U.S.C. § 1982 (Section 1982),78 reads in relevant part:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That all
persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign
power ... are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States;
and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any
previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, . . . shall
have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United
States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed
by white citizens .. .
Section I of the Act of 1866 was reenacted, but materially unaltered,
in 187080 and recodified under the Revised Statutes of 1874 as 42 U.S.C.
§ 1977 (the current Section 1981) and 42 U.S.C. § 1978 (the current
Section 1982).81
Section II of the Act of 1866 reads, in relevant part, as follows:
That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, or custom, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any
inhabitant of any State or Territory to the deprivation of any right
secured or protected by this act, or to different punishment, pains,
or penalties on account of such person having at any time been held
in a condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, or by reason of his color or race, than is prescribed for
the punishment of white persons, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall be punished by fine not
not exceeding
exceeding one thousand dollars, or imprisonment
82
one year, or both, in the discretion of the court.
To

read

the

1866

Act as

proscribing

only

state-sponsored

78. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 prohibits discrimination specifically with regard to property, stating, "All

citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by
white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." 42
U.S.C. § 1982 (2000).
79. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982

(2000)).
80. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968).
81. Id. at 422 n.28.
82. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 2.
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83
discrimination, and not private discrimination, renders it senseless.
Section II establishes no entitlement to rights. The only rights granted
by the Act are the rights set forth in Section I, namely the right "to make
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
person and property." 84 Section II exists solely to provide a criminal
punishment mechanism to accompany Section 1.85 Section II, however,
is carefully worded to apply not to any person who deprives a citizen of
the rights granted under Section I, but to any person who does so "under
color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom." 86 The
statute as a whole essentially grants a general right, but it explains that
only state actors and state entities violating the right, as opposed to
private actors and private entities violating the right, can be criminally
prosecuted for it. 87 If one were, therefore, to read Section I as providing
a right to be free from state discriminationonly, Section II, as written,
would be nonsensical.88
Second, additional evidence that Section 1981 has forbidden private
discrimination since its inception lies in the debate preceding enactment,
which was inundated with discussion of injustices African-Americans
suffered at the hands of private individuals, including white farmers
agreeing to refuse to hire black workers and white employers refusing to
remunerate their black employees. 89 And the debate made clear that
such individual acts represented the ills the 1866 Act was designed to
cure. 90 In passing the 1866 Act, Congress had before it significant
evidence of African-Americans being unfairly treated by white
individuals and organizations of individuals with no connection to state
actors. 91 Among such evidence was a comprehensive report revealing
the pervasive private animosity and hostility prevalent against blacks at
the time and emphasizing the importance of protecting them from the

83. Ford, supra note 67, at 461-62.
84. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1.
85. Ford, supra note 67, at 461.
86. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch.31, § 2.
87. Ford, supra note 67, at 461-62. When taking up the issue in 1968, the Court explained its
belief that perhaps Congress "thought it appropriate to confine criminal punishment to state officials,
oath-bound to support the supreme federal law, while allowing only civil remedies-or perhaps only
preventive relief-against private violators." Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 426 n.33
(1968).
88. Ford, supra note 67, at 462.
89. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1833 (1866); Jones, 392 U.S. at 427.
90. Jones, 392 U.S. at 428 n.40.
91. Id. at 427.
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discrimination such hostility creates.92 The report ultimately concluded
that "even if anti-Negro legislation were 'repealed in all the States lately
93
in rebellion,' equal treatment for the Negro would not yet be secured.,
Finally, as further evidence that Congress sought to prohibit private
discrimination as well as state-sponsored discrimination, when Congress
convened in 1865 to discuss the crafting of anti-discrimination
legislation, it thrice rejected proposed legislation nullifying
discriminatory state laws as being "to [sic] narrowly conceived. 94
Considering the structure of the 1866 Act, the congressional
discussion preceding its enactment, and the evidence Congress
considered while crafting the legislation, Congress clearly intended the
statute to prohibit all violations of the rights granted thereunder, whether
or not the violation was state-sponsored.
The Supreme Court's decision in The Civil Rights Cases95 did nothing
to change this. In those cases, decided in 1883, the Supreme Court
considered together several challenges to discrimination in public
accommodations brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1875.96 The
Court ultimately found against the plaintiffs, finding Sections 1 and 2 of
the statute-the two sections relevant to the suit-unconstitutional.97
While some scholars have suggested The Civil Rights Cases robbed the

1866 Act of its vitality, 98 these cases' holdings actually had no definitive
bearing on the 1866 Act; they ruled strictly with reference to the 1875
Act. 99 Any discussion of Section I of the 1866 Act was, therefore,
necessarily limited to non-binding dicta. The same is true regarding the
Supreme Court's decision in Virginia v. Rives, which did deal with the
1866 Act but ruled only on the circumstances under which Section 3 of
Statutes of 1874)
the Act (recodified as section 641 of the Revised
00
court.'
federal
to
action
state
a
of
removal
permitted
92. Id. at 428.
93. Id. at 429 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 17-25 (1866) (Report of C.
Schurz)).
94. Id. at 429 & n.46 (citing JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 177 (Collier Books rev.
ed. 1965) (1951)).
95. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
96. Id. at 4-5.
97. Id. at 26.
98. Joanna L. Grossman, Making a Federal Case Out of It: Section 1981 and At-Will
Employment, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 329, 332-33 (2001).
99. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 26. In his dissent, Justice Harlan, while noting the court
declined to explicitly rule on the 1866 Act's constitutionality, explained that portions of the majority's
opinion, in fact, served to confirm the Act's constitutionality. Id. at 35 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In light
of the Court's reasoning, Harlan states, "[lI]t is impossible ... to question the constitutional validity of
the civil rights act of 1866". Id. at 36.
100. 100 U.S. 313, 319-22 (1879). See also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 420
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Despite being good law dating to its inception in 1866, Section
1981-which prohibits private discrimination in contract formation and
was passed with an eye toward guaranteeing blacks economic rights and
equal employment opportunity-was in relative disuse for over a
century. 101 While various factors may have contributed to its disuse, the
myriad obstacles to African-Americans effectuating their legal rightsincluding severe socio-economic inequities and violent intimidationmust certainly have played a part. 10 2 Whatever the case, the statute's
latency, together with the aforementioned dicta, prompted some
commentators to conclude that by the mid-1900s, Section 1981's
"breadth had been in question10 3for nearly a century" and that section
1981 "stood on shaky ground."'
Whether or not Section 1981 truly stood on shaky ground, it stood
nonetheless, and no decision or legislative pronouncement had stripped
its ability to protect citizens from private discrimination in pursuing
economic rights. This is further crystallized by the cases in which the
Supreme Court began articulating Section 1981's power to prohibit
private discrimination, the 1975 case of Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc.,10 4 and the 1976 case of Runyon v. McCrary.'1 5 Neither
case endeavors to overrule any previous case, because neither case is
stating new law. 10 6 Rather, each case is articulating the law as it had
existed for a century and dusting off an out-of-use but fully valid statute.
So, while Johnson and Runyon may be credited with opening the door to
Section 1981 challenges to private discrimination, in fact, they merely
shed the light on a door that has long stood open. A Section 1981 claim
of employment discrimination in the private sector has been viable since
the statute was established.
n.25 (1968).
101. Grossman, supra note 98, at 332-33.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 204-217.
103. Grossman, supra note 98, at 332-34.
104. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
105. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
106. In Johnson, the Court introduced Section 1981 as it would introduce any valid statute in our
body of laws and made no reference to it ever being nullified or otherwise rendered impotent:
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1981, being the present codification of § 16 of the century-old Civil
Rights Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 144, ... on its face relates primarily to racial discrimination
in the making and enforcement of contracts. Although this Court has not specifically so
held, it is well settled among the federal Courts of Appeals-and we now join them--that
§ 1981 affords a federal remedy against discrimination in private employment on the
basis of race.
Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459-60. The Runyon Court did the same. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 168-69 ("It is now
well established that § I of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, prohibits racial
discrimination in the making and enforcement of private contracts.").
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As such, Section 1981 provides a promising vehicle for those
bringing Jethroe claims for intentional discrimination in employment
during the pre-Civil Rights era, when such discrimination was rampant.
III. THE JETHROE CLAIM: A REPARATIONS ARGUMENT?
However meritorious, Jethroe claims are likely to be perceived in the
public eye, in some sectors of academia, and perhaps in some courts, as
claims for reparations and will be consequently subjected to the
avalanche of opposition reparations claims tend to attract. Whether such
characterization is correct and whether, if correct, such characterization
indicates decreased viability for Jethroe claims, deserves exploration.
Over the course of the past decade, African-Americans have mightily
demanded legal redress for deprivations suffered under slavery and the
system of Jim Crow segregation that reigned through the majority of the
twentieth century. 10 7 Although the modem movement for delayed racial
justice does not represent the first ever such claims, 10 8 these suits have,
in recent years, been filed with unprecedented frequency.' 0 9 And while
critics may view the suits as disparate and unmerited claims brought by
eccentric dreamers, any such view would be wildly off base. Indeed,
established lawyers and scholars have banded together in organizations
to take up the reparations banner. Perhaps most renowned among these
is the Reparations Coordinating Committee (RCC), whose membership
comprises some of the nation's most accomplished and established
lawyers, scholars, activists, and public officials." 0
A. The Wide World of Reparations
"Reparation," defined by Black's Law Dictionary as "[t]he act of

107. Eric K. Yamamoto, Susan K. Serrano & Michelle Natividad Rodriguez, American Racial
Justice on Trial-Again: African American Reparations, Human Rights, and the War on Terror, 101
MICH. L. REv. 1269, 1295 (2003).
108. Reparations claims are not a new phenomenon. Indeed, the first recorded reparations lawsuit
reached court in 1915. RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS 206-07
(2000). Cornelius J. Jones sued the Treasury Department claiming that the U.S. government profited
from a tax it levied on cotton picked by enslaved African-Americans. Id. The claim failed as violative
of the Eleventh Amendment's Sovereign Immunity Clause. Id.
109. See Yamamoto, Serrano & Rodriguez, supra note 107, at 1295.
110. The RCC has counted as its members: Charles Ogletree, Randall Robinson, Cornell West,
Johnnie L. Cochran Jr., Willie Gary, Rose Sanders, Adjoa Aiyetoro, J.L. Chestnut, Alexander Pires,
Richard Scruggs, Dennis Sweet, Johnnetta Cole, Manning Marable, Ronald Walters, Richard America,
James Comer, and U.S. Congressman John Conyers. Yamamoto, Serrano & Rodriguez, supra note 107,
at 1299 n.149.
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making amends for a wrong,"'1 11 would seem to adequately characterize
a Jethroe claim's desired result. The word "reparation," in the context of
African-Americans' long quest for delayed racial justice, however, has
transcended its dictionary definition and come to represent something
far more specific. While there exists no authoritative definition of
reparations in the context of delayed racial justice for AfricanAmericans, RCC co-chairperson and Law Professor Charles Ogletree's
definition of reparations seems to capture the spirit of the term. He
explains that a reparations claim "is an attempt to obtain restitution for
the wrongs inflicted through slavery and segregation and persisting
'1 12
through the current landscape of racial discrimination in America."
Ogletree's definition gives contextual flesh to Black's skeletal
definition, providing a fuller explanation of reparations vis-a-vis
restorative racial justice in America. Notably, the size of the group
seeking restitution is not ultimately important to characterization as a
reparations claim, as evidenced by two recently filed claims. In 2002,
an African-American woman named Deadria Farmer-Paellmann brought
an action on behalf of herself and other similarly situated persons,
including millions of African-American slave descendants, against
numerous corporations seeking restitution for profits the corporations
made through their economic involvement in slavery. 113 In 2003,
surviving African-American victims of a horrific 1921 race riot in Tulsa,
Oklahoma, together with descendants of individuals killed in the riot,
brought suit against the Governor of Oklahoma, other state actors, and
the city of Tulsa seeking restitution for the crimes and torts committed
during the massacre.' 1 4 The former suit sought compensation for
millions; the latter, Alexander v. Oklahoma,115 sought compensation for
hundreds. Both indisputably are reparations claims.
While helpful in creating the parameters of reparations claims,
Professor Ogletree's characterization, by his own admission, 116 creates a
111. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1301 (7th ed. 1999).
112. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Tulsa Reparations: The Survivors' Story, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.
13,22 (2004).
113. Complaint and Jury Trial Demand at 7, Farmer-Paellmann v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 02cv-1862 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002). The Farmer-Paellmancase was eventually consolidated with
several similar cases brought in the Northern District of Illinois. The claims were ultimately dismissed,
plaintiffs appealed, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissals in all relevant respects. In re
African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721, 781 (N.D. 11. 2005), affid, 471 F.3d 754,
763 (7th Cir. 2006). A petition for certiorari was denied in October of 2007. Farmer-Paellman v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 128 S.Ct. 92 (2007).
114. First Amended Complaint, Alexander v. Oklahoma , No. 03-C-133-E, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5131 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 19, 2004), affd, 382 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2004).
115. 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5131.
116. Professor Ogletree recognizes subcategorizing reparations claims assists in assessing their
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large pool, the contents of which are certainly all claims for reparation,
but some of which are starkly different from others. Indeed, claims
brought by undisclosed millions seeking broad-based community-wide
restitution for generations of slavery profits seem only marginally
related to claims brought by one hundred-plus victims (and descendants
of victims) of a deadly race riot seeking restitution for the particular
injuries the victims suffered. Though a theme of racial justice runs
through both suits, one is not like the other.
B. Deconstructingthe Monolith
Law Professor Keith Hylton recognized this truth, examined the large
pool of cases often grouped as reparations claims, and created a
framework subcategorizing such claims. In his article, A Frameworkfor
Reparations Claims, Professor Hylton argues that reparations claims can
be divided into two types: "social welfare" claims and "doing justice"
claims. 117 Hylton uses the two above-described cases, the Farmer11 8
Paellmann case and the Alexander case, to illustrate the two models.
Under Hylton's theory, social welfare claims aim to achieve a
redistribution of resources from those who profited from slavery and Jim
Crow segregation to the community whose forbearers suffered from
them. 119 These claims "[do] not seek to do justice in any discrete case,"
The Farmerbut rather serve broader "distributional goals., 120
Paellmann claim is paradigmatic of this group. 12' Brought on behalf of
millions of unnamed individuals against several named corporate
defendants and one thousand unnamed "Corporate Does," the claim
certainly does not seek justice in any "discrete case. 122 Rather, the
claim seeks broad resource redistribution. A victory, in addition to
securing a general accounting from the defendants and establishing an
independent historic commission, 123 would result in the transfer of
wealth, in the form of damages, from thousands of companies to
millions of people. The award, resulting in this massive redistribution,
would accrue to a large segment of society-all African-Americans
descended from slavery-as back-pay and interest together with some
viability. Ogletree, supra note 112, at 26.
117. Keith N. Hylton, A Frameworkfor ReparationsClaims, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 31, 3132 (2004).

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 32-34.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Complaint and Jury Trial Demand, supra note 113, at 19.
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sum of punitive damages to assist them in faring well. Hylton's "social
welfare" moniker for this model seems apropos.
The extent to which this model is truly a broad-based societal
initiative is underscored by many reparationists' view that any award in
such a case not be issued to millions of individuals directly, but rather be
pooled and used to effectuate social programs aimed at benefiting the
entire African-American community. For instance, numerous scholars,
including Professor Ogletree and activist and reparations pioneer
Randall Robinson, advocate that proceeds from a lawsuit such as
Farmer-Paellmann's should serve to guarantee the prevailing plaintiffs
(members of the African-American community descended from slavery)
fully subsidized educational opportunities. 124 A remedy of this sort
further elucidates the extent to which a claim brought by millions of
African-Americans against thousands of companies is truly a social
welfare claim.
Separate from these social welfare reparations claims, Hylton argues,
are doing justice reparations claims. 125 The latter claims, unlike the
former, seek justice in discrete cases. 12 6 As Hylton explains, this
approach "involves identifying particular individuals or entities that
committed bad acts and particular victims who were injured [and]
specifying the precise acts that led to injury, and the sums necessary to
compensate victims for the injuries.' 27 Hylton, thus, essentially sets out
a four-prong test to identify doing justice reparations claims. Such
claims are characterized by:
(1) identifiable victim(s);
(2) identifiable perpetrator(s);
(3) identifiable bad act(s); and
28
(4) a specified compensatory sum.1
Just as the Farmer-Paellman claim illustrates the social welfare
model of reparations, the Alexander claim illustrates the doing justice
model. In the Alexander case, the plaintiffs are the precise people
victimized during two brutal days of rioting in Tulsa, Oklahoma as well
as the descendants of victims who have since died. 129 And the bad
actors are similarly identifiable: among them the Tulsa police force,
124. See, e.g., Ogletree, supra note 112, at 27. ROBINSON, supra note 108, at 244-45.
125. Hylton, supra note 117, at 32.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See id.
129. See Ogletree, supra note 112, at 18.

2008]

EXPLORING JETHROE'S INJUSTICE

813

which deputized many of the rioters, and the Oklahoma State National
Guard, whose officially activated members contributed to the
identifiable acts of terror. 130 Finally, specific damages amounts are
easily calculable based on the identifiable bad acts. Rather than broad
redistribution of wealth, the Tulsa case seeks justice for the particular
13 1
identifiable people injured in the riots as well as their descendants.
Like the Tulsa plaintiffs' claims, Jethroe claims-which meet
Hylton's four prongs-illustrate the doing justice model. The victims
are easily identifiable, namely, they are the retired employees who
suffered employment discrimination resulting in reduced or denied
pension payments. The perpetrators, too, are easily identifiable: they are
the victims' former employers. The identifiable bad acts are the
discriminatory actions leading to the reduced or denied pensions. And
the compensatory sum is the sum of denied pension payments. Jethroe
claims are, indeed, paradigmatic doing justice claims.
Hylton's deconstruction of the reparations monolith makes clear that
some adverse reactions to reparations may be of limited scope and apply
only to social welfare reparations claims, such as Farmer-Paellmann's
claim seeking restitution for the stolen labor of slavery. 132 Doing justice
claims, such as Jethroe claims, on the other hand, are "far more
consistent with tort doctrine and likely to meet their goals than the

130. Seeid. at 17.
131. Hylton, supra note 117, at 37.
132. Consider, for instance, conservative commentator David Horowitz's oft-cited ten arguments
against reparations: (1)"There Is No Single Group Clearly Responsible For The Crime Of Slavery;" (2)
"There Is No One Group That Benefited Exclusively From Its Fruits;" (3) "Only A Tiny Minority Of
White Americans Ever Owned Slaves, And Others Gave Their Lives To Free Them;" (4) "America
Today Is A Multi-Ethnic Nation and Most Americans Have No Connection (Direct Or Indirect) To
Slavery;" (5) "The Historical Precedents Used To Justify The Reparations Claim Do Not Apply, And
The Claim Itself Is Based On Race Not Injury;" (6) "The Reparations Argument Is Based On The
Unfounded Claim That All African-American Descendants of Slaves Suffer From The Economic
Consequences Of Slavery And Discrimination;" (7) "The Reparations Claim Is One More Attempt To
Turn African-American Into Victims. It Sends A Damaging Message To The African-American
Community." (8) "Reparations To African-Americans Have Already Been Paid;" (9) "What About The
Debt Blacks Owe To America?" (10) "The Reparations Claim Is A Separatist Idea That Sets AfricanAmericans Against The Nation That Gave Them Freedom." David Horowitz, Ten Reasons Why
Reparationsfor Blacks Is a Bad Idea for Blacks-and Racist Too, FrontPageMagazine.com, Jan. 3,
2001, http://www.frontpagemag .com/Articles/Printable.asp?ID=I 153.
Horowitz's arguments are facially inapplicable to doing justice reparations claims. Instead,
they are aimed squarely at social welfare claims and focus on slavery-based causes of action that do not
satisfy Hylton's four prongs. Indeed, in making the fifth of his ten anti-reparations arguments, Professor
Horowitz himself essentially endorses the doing justice model of reparations. He juxtaposes slaverybased reparations claims with claims in which "the recipients of reparations were the direct victims of
the injustice," id., and argues against the former while recognizing the viability of the latter. Thus, even
Professor Horowitz, long identified as hoisting the anti-reparations banner, would seemingly agree that
Jethroe claims surmount the obstacles he believes quash other reparations claims.
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social-welfare-based claims." 1
Although Jethroe claims qualify as doing justice claims under
Hylton's framework and are thus likely more viable than their social
welfare-based counterparts,1 34 any litigated Jethroe claim would
encounter resistance on statutes of limitations grounds. As such,
analysis of statutes of limitations and their purposes, the manner in
which they would impact Jethroe claims, and the possibility of Jethroe
claimants avoiding their application, follows.
IV.

JETHROE CLAIMS AND STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS

"[W]hat is the justification for depriving a man of his rights,' 135
a pure
time?"
of
lapse
the
of
consequence
in
goes,
evil as far as it
Former Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes posed the
above question in a vigorous critique of statutes of limitations in his
1897 Harvard Law Review article titled The Path of the Law.136 By the
time Justice Holmes expressed his displeasure with statutes of
limitations, however, they were long entrenched as an element of this
nation's legal system. Statutes of limitations have been a part of this
nation's legal landscape, serving to limit the time period during which a
plaintiff can bring a claim against a defendant, since the earliest days of

133. Hylton, supra note 117, at 31.
134. This is not to say any movement for social welfare reparations, born of stolen slave labor or
otherwise, will or should fail. Indeed, as Professor Ogletree has argued, despite the challenges such
claims face, "the rejection of slavery reparations is a little too convenient.... [in that it] allows us to
forget or deny that slavery imposed a holocaust that resulted in the extermination of millions of
Africans." Ogletree, supra note 112, at 29. Recognizing this concern, Eric Yamamoto, Susan Serrano,
and Michelle Rodriguez propose an alternative approach to asserting slavery reparations and other social
welfare reparations claims-one that reframes the "notion of reparations" as not only repair of "the
material conditions of ... those dispossessed" but as the "repair[] of breaches in the polity."
Yamamoto, Serrano & Rodriguez, supra note 107, at 1302-03. They describe their approach and its
practical benefits as follows:
This repair paradigm of reparations does not rely on individual rights and remedies and
focuses instead on (1) historical wrongs committed by one group, (2) which harmed, and
continue to harm, both the material living conditions and psychological outlook of
another group, (3) which, in turn, has damaged present-day relations between the groups,
and (4) which ultimately has damaged the larger community, resulting in divisiveness,
distrust, social disease-a breach in the polity. Within this framework, reparations by the
polity and for the polity are justified on moral and political grounds-healing social
wounds by bringing back into the community those wrongly excluded.
Id. at 1303.
135. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 476 (1897).
136. Id.
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37
colonial law.'

A. Statutes of Limitations: The Justifications; the Concerns
The primary justification underlying statutes of limitations "is
undoubtedly one of fairness to the defendant."' 3 8
There is an
understanding in the law that defendants should, at some point, have a
reasonable expectation that old claims not be brought to bear against
them.' 39 As such, they can be secure in the knowledge that they will not
be called on to defend a suit when "evidence has been lost, memories
have faded, and witnesses have disappeared."' 140
In essence, by
encouraging plaintiffs to assert claims in a timely manner, statutes of
limitations serve to relieve defendants from the burden of facing stale
claims. 14 1 While fairness to defendants may provide the primary
justification for statutes of limitations, other justifications have been
posited as well. Among these are the importance of prompt enforcement
of the laws and diligent action in asserting legal claims, reducing the
volume of litigation, and avoiding retrospective application of societal
standards. 142 These justifications, among perhaps others, have inspired
and supported the implementation of statutes of limitations throughout
American legal history.
Still, despite the enduring legacy of statutes of limitations, Justice
Holmes's concern resounds today, just as it did in 1897. Indeed, one
hundred years after Justice Holmes examined the subject, Law Professor
Tyler Ochoa and Judge Andrew Wistrich took up the inquiry in their
article, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of Limitations.143 Key to any
137. Michael E. Chaplin, Note, Reviving Contract Claims Barred by the Statute of Limitations: An
Examination of the Legal and Ethical Foundationfor Revival, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1571 (2000).
138. Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185 (1950). See
also Howard W. Wasserman, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and John Doe Defendants: A Study in Section 1983
Procedure, 25 CARDOzO L. REV. 793, 813 (2003) ("Limitations periods protect a range of interests
inuring primarily to potential defendants."); United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 11, 117 (1979) (stating
that statutes of limitations "protect defendants and the courts from having to deal with cases in which the
search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of
witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise").
139. Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, supra note 138, at 1185; Wasserman,
supranote 138, at 813-14; Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117.
140. Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, supra note 138, at 1185 (quoting Order of
R.R. Tels. v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)). See also Wasserman, supra note
138, at 813; Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117.
141. See Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, supra note 138, at 1185; Wasserman,
supra note 138, at 813; Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117.
142. Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of Limitation, 28
PAC. L.J. 453,488-97 (1997).
143. Id.
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examination of statutes of limitations is an understanding that such rules
serve to effectuate a legal system whose duty it is to resolve substantive
claims. As Ochoa and Wistrich explain:
[T]he fundamental reason for having a legal system is to resolve disputes
on their merits under the substantive law. Procedural rules are necessary
to maintain order and to promote efficiency within the legal system.
However necessary such rules may be, they are not the legal system's
reason for being. Rather, they 1are subordinate to the more fundamental
purposes of the substantive law.
Eight years later, in 2005, Law Professor Suzette Malveaux furthered
the inquiry, launching a comprehensive examination of statutes of
limitations and expressing significant concern as to their potential role in
extinguishing racial justice claims.14 5 These works have revealed that
just as several policies cut in favor of statutes of limitations, many other
policies cut against statutes of limitations. Principally, because the legal
system exists to resolve disputes on the substance, disposition on
procedural rather than substantive grounds would seem to undermine
that purpose. 146 Indeed, in light of this purpose behind the legal system,
one could certainly argue that "deciding an issue on some ground other
than the substantive merits seems to miss the point."' 147 It may be
reasonably argued, therefore, that statutes of limitations may hinder the
law more than they help by seeking to improve the legal system at the
expense of the system's ultimate mission.
As a related, yet distinct, matter, the "dignitary value" of the legal
system rests in large part on the premise that people with valid
complaints are entitled to their "day in court."' 148 The denial of that day
may cause the denied plaintiff significant frustration and disenchantment
with the legal system and perhaps the entire political system in which it
exists. 149 Indeed, "no democratic political theory can ignore the sense of
injustice that smolders in the psyche of the victim of injustice. If
democracy means anything morally, it signifies that the lives of all
citizens matter, and that their sense of their rights must prevail.
Everyone deserves a hearing at the very least . . . ."'
When

144. Id. at 501.
145. Suzette M. Malveaux, Statutes of Limitations: A
ReparationsLitigation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 68 (2005).

Policy Analysis in the Context of

146. Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 142, at 500.
147. Id. at 501.
148. Id. at 501-02; Malveaux, supra note 145, at 82.
149. Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 142, at 501-02.

150. Malveaux, supra note 145, at 84 (quoting JUDITH N. SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE 35
(1990)).
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dispossessed of that hearing, disaffection may reasonably flow, and the
damage to individuals denied their day in court may be severe.' 51 They
may, as a result of the denial, lose confidence in society to protect them,
and may, therefore, feel alienated from society and be less inclined to
abide by its rules.' 52 Any such result would certainly weaken society.
Despite the policies cutting against statutes of limitations and the
scholarship that has elucidated them, statutes of limitations remain part
and parcel of our legal system. Considering the arguments against
statutes of limitations, however, a system of statutes of limitations
without exception would be irrational and would stand at odds with a
legal system intent on resolving disputes on the merits. And, indeed, the
American legal system does not apply statutes of limitations without
exception. Rather, when considerations militate against the application
of statutes of limitations, the law casts them aside, going directly to the
merits of a dispute in spite of the aforementioned general justifications
for time-barring claims.' 53
Disputes between the state and an individual accused of a crime are
particularly likely to proceed without regard for the time elapsed
between crime and prosecution. For instance, no prosecution in
Wyoming or South Carolina can be time-barred, as neither state has any
criminal statute of limitations154 While a statute of limitations exists in
Kentucky for misdemeanors, no such statute exists for felonies. 55 The
majority of states do have statutes of limitations for most felonies, but
no state has such a statute for the crime of murder.' 56 And ten of the
fifty states have no statutes of limitations for rape. 157 Some jurisdictions
have identified various felonies other than murder and rape for which no
statutes of limitations apply. For instance, in Illinois, prosecutions for
58
arson, treason, and forgery are not time barred. 1
The arguments in favor of criminal statutes of limitations mirror the
arguments in favor of civil statutes of limitations. Some arguments
emphasize a potential defendant's right to repose. 159 Others stress that
15 1. Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 142, at 502-503.
152. Id. at 503.
153. Malveaux, supra note 145, at 83.
154. See Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020, 1027 (Wyo. 1986); Jodi Leibowitz, Note, Criminal
Statutes of Limitations: An Obstacle to the Prosecution and Punishment of Child Sexual Abuse, 25
CARDOZO L. REV. 907, 926 (2003).
155. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 500.050 (West 2007).
156. Story, 721 P.2d at 1027.
157. Id.
158. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-5(a)(1) (2007); No Statute of Limitations on Certain Sex
Offenses-P.A. 92-0752, 91 111.B.J. 280, 281 (2003).
159. Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970).
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evidence grows weaker over the course of time, and that an untimely
prosecution is less likely than a timely prosecution to render a correct
result. 160 Still others stress the inherent importance of prompt, rather
and action on the part of the wronged party,
than delayed, investigation
16 1
namely the state.
For many crimes, however, as noted above, the arguments against
statutes of limitations win out. Foremost among these may be society's
need to see justice done. 162 The idea that a person has wronged an
individual or individuals within a society, and thus harmed society itself,
but has avoided being held accountable for the wrong solely because of
time's passage, may be reasonably viewed as problematic. The severity
and consequences of the injustice, however, seemingly correlate with the
severity of societal displeasure with time-barred prosecution. For
instance, while time-barred prosecution for the theft of one dollar may
not stoke passions among many, time-barred prosecution for ending a
human life more likely will. This explains why no state time-bars
murder prosecutions, while forty-eight of fifty states time bar
misdemeanor prosecutions. When considering murder, the importance
of justice being served outweighs all countervailing rationales for timeWhen considering misdemeanor offenses,
barring prosecution.
however, the rationales for time-barring prosecution generally outweigh
the importance of justice being served. As noted, between the extremes
of murder and misdemeanor offenses, different communities balance the
equities with different outcomes, resulting in different statutes of
limitations in different jurisdictions.
We see, then, that balancing policies favoring criminal statutes of
limitations against policies disfavoring criminal statutes of limitations
reveals that sometimes the latter outweigh the former. The same is true
in the civil realm. Where policies opposing statutes of limitations
outweigh policies favoring statutes of limitations, statutes of limitations
are disfavored. This is the case for civil actions to determine paternity.
The U.S. Congress has rejected short statutes of limitations periods in
paternity cases, determining that paternity claims should, as a matter of
timing, be viable until at least eighteen years after the subject child's
birth. 16 And, indeed, some states impose no statutes of limitations-of
160. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971).
161. Toussie, 397U.S. at 115.
162. See United States v. Quinones, 196 F. Supp. 2d 416, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd, 313 F.3d 49
(2d Cir. 2002) ("[T]here is typically no statute of limitations for first-degree murder-for the obvious
reason that it would be intolerable to let a cold-blooded murderer escape justice through the mere
passage of time ... ").
163. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(A)(ii) (2000) (demanding that states, as a condition of receiving
federal funds, not establish shorter statutes of limitations periods for paternity actions); see also Clark v.
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any length-on paternity actions. 164 Such legislation suggests that, as a
policy matter, the interest in establishing parental obligation outweighs
the repose a narrow statute of limitations period, or, in some states, any
statutes of limitations
period, would otherwise offer a non65
acknowledging father.'
In addition, descending from "the ancient principle that time does not
run against the king," many civil actions brought by the government are
not subject to statutes of limitations. 166 Modern justification for this
age-old principle lies in the belief that "public rights, revenues, and
property should not be forfeited due to the negligence of public
167
officials" in bringing timely claims for the benefit of the populace.
Among claims to avoid time-bars under this theory are civil proceedings
across all states against taxpayers for payment of assessed and owed
federal income tax, where the defendant files a fraudulent return or fails
to file a return altogether. 168 Having weighed the policies for and
against statutes of limitations governing the government's ability to
bring such actions, Congress has turned away from the rationale for
statutes of limitations and chosen to allow such proceedings regardless
of time passage.
B. Seeking to Shelter Jethroe Claims
Clearly, none of these per se exceptions to the general application of
statutes of limitations in civil actions is of use in considering the
viability of a Jethroe claim. Jethroe claimants, however, comprise a
class of plaintiffs for whom the opportunity to vindicate their rights is
paramount. As Malveaux explains, "Access to the courts is particularly
important for minorities, the poor, lower socioeconomic classes, and
other disenfranchised groups who must rely on the legal system for
protection of basic human and civil rights."' 6 9 Such access, therefore,
seemingly is particularly important for Jethroe claimants. Absent shelter

Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988).
164. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-102(b) (2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,§ 205 (2000); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-7-952.
165. Carlotta P. Wells, Statutes of Limitations in Paternity Proceedings: Barring An
'Illegitimate's'Rightto Support, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 567, 577 (1983).
166. SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1491 (9th Cir. 1993). See also Catherine E. Maxson, Note, The
Applicabilityof Section 2462's Statute of Limitations to SEC Enforcement Suits in Light of the Remedies
Act of1990, 94 MICH.L. REV. 512, 513-14 (1995).
167. Rind, 991 F.2d at 1491.
168. See I.R.C. § 6501(c)(1)-(3) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). Notably, regarding criminal
prosecutions for failure to file a return, the statute of limitations is six years. 1d. § 6531(4).
169. Malveaux, supra note 145, at 84.
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from statutes of limitations, these statutes will operate to thwart Jethroe
claimants despite both the discrimination they suffered during their
employment and the current financial implications of that
discrimination. And in that statutes of limitations are "relatively crude"
may thwart
rules ill-equipped to separate "wheat from chaff," they
170
compelling Jethroe claims and weak Jethroe claims alike.
Thus, the concern that statutes of limitations "will sometimes be used
to defeat claims which are both substantively just and otherwise
relatively provable," 171'-the precise concern which Holmes, Ochoa,
Wistrich, Malveaux, and others have expressed-endures in the Jethroe
context. Avoiding the festering injustice of race-based pension denial
born of decades old racial discrimination, the financial consequences to
the denied pensioners, and the consequential disenchantment they breed,
therefore, requires inhibiting statutes of limitations dismissal. Common
law doctrine, legislative action, and traditional notions of professional
responsibility provide potential avenues toward such inhibition. These
avenues are addressed in turn.
1. Common Law Tolling and Accrual
Three common law "[m]echanisms for [e]xempting [c]laims from
[l]imitations [p]eriods"1 72-- equitable tolling, the continuing violations
doctrine, and the discovery rule-merit exploration in the Jethroe claim
context.
a. Equitable Tolling
The equitable tolling doctrine permits plaintiffs to bring suit "after the
expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, provided they have
173
been prevented from doing so due to inequitable circumstances.,
While the origin of the equitable tolling doctrine is not entirely clear, it
dates back in American jurisprudence to at least 1944, when the
170. Chaplin, supra note 137, at 1589.
171. Id.
172. Malveaux, supra note 145, at 86.
173. Rosner v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1208 (S.D. Fla. 2002). While courts have

occasionally required a showing of a defendant's bad action or fraud in considering equitable tolling
application, see, e.g., Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F.Supp.2d 117, 135 (2000), such an approach

seems a confused conflation of equitable estoppel and equitable tolling. Equitable estoppel requires a
defendant's "fraudulent concealment" or unfulfilled "promise to provide restitution," Malveaux, supra
note 146, at 99, while "[e]quitable tolling applies even ifthere is no concealment" or unfulfilled
restitution promise. Alexander, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5131, at **24-25. Indeed, the equitable tolling

inquiry focuses on whether inequitable circumstances-to which defendant may not have contributedprevented timely filing.
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Supreme Court tolled the statute of limitations running against a
plaintiff's civil action while the plaintiff was locked in a prolonged
administrative proceeding regarding the claim.' 74 The Court did not
endeavor to set forth its rationale for the doctrine at that time, but it did
so twenty years later in deciding Burnett v. New York Central Railroad
Co., a case involving an employee's suit against his employer alleging
injury on the job. 175 A series of procedural gaffes resulted in the
plaintiff, Otto Burnett, filing his Federal Employees' Liability Act
(FELA) suit in federal court after the statute of limitations had
elapsed. 176 The district court
dismissed the case as time-barred, and the
77
1
affirmed.
Appeals
of
Court
On appeal, the Supreme Court noted that it had, in previous cases,
relaxed time-bars to bringing suit when "a plaintiff has not slept on his
rights but, rather, has been prevented from asserting them."'178 The
Court recognized the validity of statutes of limitations but articulated
that the policy of repose reflected in statutes of limitations, which is
"designed to protect defendants, is frequently outweighed... where the
interests of justice require vindication of the plaintiffs rights."'179 In
determining when "the interests of justice require vindication of the
plaintiffs rights," and thus when equitable tolling is appropriate, the
Court looked largely to the statute underlying the cause of action, FELA,
and the congressional intent in passing it.' 80
Noting FELA's
"humanitarian purpose,"' 181 the Court felt it "clear that Congress would
not wish a plaintiff deprived of his rights when no policy underlying a
statute of limitations is served in doing so."' 82 With this foundation, the
equitable tolling doctrine has developed as a legitimate means of
pursuing claims otherwise blocked by statutes of limitations.
As the doctrine of equitable tolling has developed, courts have turned
to it in resolving claims for restorative justice. Most notable perhaps is
Rosner v. United States, a case Malveaux explores in detail. M In that
case, heard by the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida in 2002, plaintiffs asserted a federal class action lawsuit
against the United States on behalf of Jewish individuals of Hungarian
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Order of R.R. Tels. v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944).
380 U.S. 424, 434 (1965).
See id. at 425.
Id.
Id. at 429.
Id. at 428.

180. Id. at 434.
181. Id.

182. Id.
183. Malveaux, supra note 145, at 106-07.
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descent and their descendants who were deprived of their property
during the World War II era Nazi-occupation of Europe. 18 4 Plaintiffs
pled that in the spring of 1944, shortly after Germany invaded Hungary,
Hungarian officials, beholden to the Nazi regime, decreed that all Jewish
property would become property of the state and began to confiscate
185
it.
As 1944 turned to 1945 and the Nazi's loosening grip on Europe
became evident, Nazi officials demanded that Hungarian officials send
the confiscated property to Germany aboard a train."i 6 The train,
numbering over forty cars full of stolen property and known as the
"Hungarian Gold Train" made it as far as Salzburg, Austria before being
intercepted and seized by the United States military. 187 The military did
not return the property to the rightful owners, but instead 8sold
or
8
otherwise distributed it to various individuals and organizations.'
The U.S. government moved to dismiss the suit on statute of
limitations grounds, noting the applicable statute of limitations was six
89
years and had run by 1953, decades before plaintiffs initiated suit.
The Court, however, relying on the equitable tolling doctrine, refused to
dismiss the case. 190 In finding equitable tolling to be appropriate, the
Court turned to the U.S. Supreme Court's 2002 decision in Young v.
United States, in which the Court considered the applicability of
equitable tolling to the IRS's attempt to collect back taxes against a
debtor. 19 1 The Young Court first reemphasized a basic principle of
Burnett, that "limitations periods are 'customarily subject to "equitable
tolling," unless tolling would be 'inconsistent with the text of the
relevant statute,"",192 and it then set forth two principle sets of
circumstances under which equitable tolling is permitted: (1) where a
plaintiff filed a defective pleading during the limitations period and (2)
where a plaintiff was induced into allowing the limitations period to
run.193 The Court went further, however, making clear that equitable
tolling is not limited to such circumstances and that it might also be

184. Rosner v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1203-04 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
185. Id. at 1204.

186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1204-05.

189. Id. at 1206.
190. Id.
191. 535 U.S. 43, 44 (2002).
192. Id. at 49 (quoting Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990); United States v.
Beggerley, 524 U.S. 38, 48 (1998)).
193. Id. at 50.
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94

appropriate in other cases.'
The Rosner Court seized on the second of Young's articulated
grounds for equitable tolling, finding that equitable tolling was
applicable based on plaintiffs' allegations that the government for years
falsely claimed the property on the train was not labeled sufficiently to
allow redistribution to its former owners and that the government
refused to answer repeated inquiries about the property. 195 Because the
Court was obligated to accept the plaintiffs' allegations as true under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) analysis, the allegations of
inducement were sufficient to defeat the government's motion to
dismiss. 196 Like the Young Court before it, however, the Rosner Court
explained that equitable tolling may be appropriate
when there is neither
197
pleading.
defective
a
of
filing
the
nor
inducement
Jethroe claimants' circumstances arguably set forth the "other" type
of case the Young Court and the Rosner Court were contemplating when
defining equitable tolling's applicability. As an initial matter, in
determining whether equitable tolling is appropriate with reference to a
statutory claim, "'the basic inquiry is whether congressional purposes
are effectuated by tolling the statute of limitations."' 198 The Burnett
Court made this point in establishing the parameters of the equitable
tolling doctrine. Indeed, as previously noted, in deciding to toll the
statute of limitations under the principle of equitable tolling, the Court
was motivated by the "humanitarian purpose" of FELA-the underlying
statute'99-suggesting FELA to be the sort of statute for which statutes
of limitations tolling might effectuate congressional purposes.
Like FELA, Section 1981 serves a humanitarian purpose, a purpose
Congress would likely not want undercut on procedural grounds.
Indeed, Section 1981 is arguably as humanitarian as any statute in
American law. As noted in Part II of this Article, what currently exists
as Section 1981 is an amalgam of two statutes enacted in the years
following slavery's abolition to protect blacks in the tumultuous
aftermath of slavery from race-based discrimination of various sorts,
including abridgment of economic rights. 200 They served to give blacks
194. Id.
195. Rosner v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1209 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
196. See id.
197. Seeid. at 1208-09.
198. Kathryn Doi, Comment, Equitable Modification of Title VII Time Limitations to Promote the
Statute's Remedial Nature: The Casefor Maximum Application of the Zipes Rationale, 18 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 749, 779 n.113 (1985) (quoting Jones v. TransOhio Sav. Ass'n, 747 F.2d 1037, 1040 (6th Cir.
1984)).
199. Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 434 (1965).
200. See supra text accompanying notes 67-77.
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an opportunity to live in America as free persons rather than chattel and
to relieve them of the stigma long associated with their skin color.20 '
Equality, fairness, and relief from oppression sit at the root of Section
1981. The statute, without question, serves a humanitarian purpose.
Further, nothing in Section 1981 suggests tolling is inconsistent with the
statute, thereby making the limitations period "subject to 'equitable
tolling"' under Young.2 °2 If any statute's causes of action deserve
adjudication on the substance and thus a waiving of the limitations
period, Section 198 l's do.
Recognizing the humanitarian nature of Section 1981, and thus the
potential application of equitable tolling in the Jethroe claims context, it
is necessary to determine the nature of the inequitable circumstances
impacting potential Jethroe claimants. While Jethroe claimants may or
may not have an argument that they were induced to let time run or that
they filed a defective pleading, Young teaches us neither showing is
necessary. 2003 Instead, seizing upon Young's "other" category, Jethroe
claimants may seek to show that the conditions African-Americans
suffered after slavery and through much of the twentieth century created
inequitable circumstances, essentially preventing the assertion of their
claims.
To understand the conditions facing Jethroe claimants, it may be
helpful to consider the circumstances facing one of their generation,
Jethroe himself.
Jethroe, like other African-Americans of his
generation, was born into and reared in an American society in which
being black equated with abridged rights and agitation for effectuation
of those rights elicited a violent and oppressive backlash.20 4
Jethroe was born January 20, 1917,205 just over fifty years after his
nation condoned the bondage and forced labor of his ancestors and one
and a half years before the "Red Summer" of 1919.206 The "Red
Summer" was so named because of the blood spilled throughout the
country in unprecedented racial clashes catalyzed when AfricanAmerican soldiers, returning from the comparatively non-racially
201. See Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 19811982 (2000)) ("[A]II persons born in the United States... of every race and color, without regard to any
previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, . . . shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory in the United States,... as is enjoyed by white citizens.").
202. Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49 (2002) (quoting Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs,
498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990).
203. See id. at 50.
204. LEE E. WILLIAMS & LEE E. WILLIAMS II, ANATOMY OF FOUR RACE RIOTS: RACIAL
CONFLICT IN KNOXVILLE, ELAINE (ARKANSAS), TULSA AND CHICAGO, 1919-1921, at 7 (1972).
205. Marazzi, supra note 11, at 110.
206. WILLIAM M. TUTrLE, JR., RACE RIOT: CHICAGO IN THE RED SUMMER OF 1919, at 14 (1970).
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charged atmosphere of Europe, insisted on the rights to which they were
entitled as American citizens and were consequently attacked for their
insistence. 20 7 This adverse and hostile reaction to African-Americans
asserting their rights characterized the world Jethroe and his
contemporaries knew during their early formative years.
Lynchings, defined as "killing[s] done by several people acting in
concert outside the legal process to punish a person perceived to have
violated a law or custom," and systematically used to terrorize the
African-American community, occurred with relative frequency.20 8
During the decade in which Jethroe was born, 622 lynchings were
recorded, and over 4,700 lynchings were recorded through 1968.209 This
number, of course, does not approximate the true number of lynchings
perpetrated, as many occurred in back woods and other isolated areas,
unknown to all but the perpetrators and, until their last breaths, the
victims. 2 Even in the absence of actual violence, the threat it presented
was omnipresent for blacks in America. For a black person, any
expression of equality or upward mobility carried with it the risk of
fierce reprisals from race hating individuals or groups.2 1' Chief among
these groups was the Ku Klux Klan, which was, at the time, easily
America's largest and most organized terrorist organization.2 12 With
ranks swelled on the heels of D.W. Griffith's 1915 racial propagandist
film, Birth of a Nation, the Klan's members numbered in the millions.2 13
Facing the ubiquitous threat of violence, most blacks had little choice
but to accept their lot in America, however meager and subservient it
2 14
was. Under the Supreme Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson,
2
15
racial segregation was the law of the land.
Blacks were restricted to
certain living spaces, restaurants, sections of trains and buses, schools,
public restrooms, water fountains, and other public accommodations.2 16
207. WILLIAMS & WILLIAMS, supra note 204, at 6-7.
208. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 42 (1997).

209. Lynching Statistics by Year,
lynchingyear.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2007).

http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/shipp/

210. WITHOUT SANCTUARY: LYNCHING PHOTOGRAPHY IN AMERICA 12 (James Allen ed., 2000).

211. See WILLIAMS & WILLIAMS, supra note 204, at 38.
212. NANCY MACLEAN, BEHIND THE MASK OF CHIVALRY: THE MAKING OF THE SECOND Ku
KLUX KLAN, at xi (1994).

213.
214.
215.
Thirteenth

Id.
163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, (1954)).
See Darrell A. H. Miller, The Stain of Slavery: Notes Toward an Attainder Theory of the
Amendment, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 1011, 1021 (2007) ("In 1896, Plessy v. Ferguson sealed shut

the dim hope of redress for state-sponsored discrimination under either the Thirteenth or Fourteenth
Amendments.").
216. Christopher Coleman, Laurence D. Nee & Leonard S. Rubinowitz, Social Movements and

Social-Change Litigation: Synergy in the Montgomery Bus Protest, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 663, 686
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were theoretically equal, they
And while the separate accommodations
217
were, in fact, generally far inferior.
Blacks faired no better in terms of employment opportunities. Only
decades removed from chattel slavery, forced servitude in various forms
continued to reign when Jethroe came of age. As slavery ended, tenant
farming and sharecropping burgeoned, as limitations on blacks' ability
to own land left many with little choice but to tend whites' land for
wages insufficient to meet their cost of living. 2 18 There thus developed
"a system of peonage under which White landowners placed Black
and debt
workers into debt and then obtained a version of servitude
219
recycling in order to keep workers beholden and available."
So, while formal enslavement of blacks was eradicated, oppressive
post-emancipation employment relationships between white landowners
and black workers essentially replaced it. Rather than root out such
forced servitude, local law enforcement officers often supported, and,
indeed, effectuated it. 220 For instance, throughout the American South
there developed "convict-lease system[s] whereby Black workers would
be rounded up through charges and convictions of minor, vague
offenses, such as vagrancy, and then rented out to 'employers' who
could use the labor in neo-servitude.,, 22 1 To the extent blacks were not
subjected to forced labor, employment discrimination generally yielded
them "[l]ow wages and limited employment options. 2 22
So, as Sam Jethroe and his contemporaries grew into adulthood, racebased exploitative employment and employment discrimination were
So, too, was enduring the exploitation and
standard practice.
discrimination without legal complaint. Blacks who challenged white
authority with respect to employment relationships, like blacks who
challenged white authority in other ways, were, as noted above, often
subject to lynchings and other forms of racial violence. On the other
hand, blacks who "did not challenge labor controls [were] able to call
upon White 'benevolence' to intervene in situations which could
otherwise have led to" such violence.2 23
Thus, while the law granted African-Americans the right to equal
n.150 (2005).
217. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("Separate ...facilities are inherently
unequal.").
218. James W. Fox Jr., Intimations of Citizenship: Repressions and Expressions of Equal
Citizenship in the Era ofJim Crow, 50 HOw. L.J. 113, 148 (2006).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 149.
223. Id.
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opportunity in employment under Section 1981, the entitlement was
largely empty, because its assertion invited the threat of intimidation,
brutality, and death. Indeed, for much of the twentieth century, to be
black meant to know one's place, to avoid threatening Caucasian
authority, and to refrain from challenging the societal status quo, legally
or otherwise.
Such disenfranchisement, and the consequent inaccessibility to the
courts, has been central to equitable tolling application in the past.
Malveaux notes that the Rosner court found the "'brutal reality of the
Holocaust, and the resulting extraordinary circumstances that Plaintiffs
were forced to endure' were important pieces of its equitable tolling
analysis" and that the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York in a similar case involving Nazi property
appropriations, Bodner v. Banque Paribas,224 found that the "plaintiffs
could hardly have been expected to bring [their] claims at the end of
World War II.,,225 Similarly, in the context of African-American
subjugation in the United States, the Alexander court, in 2004,
determined that equitable tolling of plaintiffs' claims was appropriate in
view of "a legal system that was openly hostile to them, courts that were
practically closed to their claims, . . . and the era of Jim Crow. 22 6
These World War II-era Nazi appropriations cases and the Alexander
case provide powerful support for a Jethroe claimant seeking to prevail
upon the equitable tolling doctrine. 227 Alexander is particularly
analogous and, thus, particularly helpful. Like the Alexander plaintiffs,
Jethroe claimants suffered injury in the Jim Crow era because of their
race, and like the Alexander plaintiffs, Jethroe claimants seek redress
decades later, after the civil rights movement prompted a shift in our
nation's legal regime. It merits noting that the injury for which the
Alexander plaintiffs sought redress-bodily injury and damage to
property during the course of a deadly race riot-was a great deal more
harrowing than the injury for which Jethroe claimants would seek
redress-discriminatory denial of pension benefits. That said, economic
224. 114 F. Supp. 2d 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
225. Malveaux, supra note 145, at 107-08 (quoting Rosner v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 2d
1202, 1209 (S.D. Fla. 2002); Bodner, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 135).
226. Alexander v. Oklahoma, No. 03-C-133-E, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5131, at *30 (N.D. Okla.
Mar. 19, 2004), affd, 382 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2004).
227. While both the Rosner defendants and the Alexander defendants seemingly obfuscated
information potentially helpful to plaintiffs' claims, neither court explicated such obfuscation was
necessary to its finding that equitable tolling was appropriate, suggesting that inequitable circumstances
not bom directly of defendants' actions could have sustained the courts' decisions to apply the equitable
tolling doctrine. See Rosner, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 1208-09. See also Alexander v. Oklahoma, 382 F.3d

1206, 1216 (10th Cir. 2004). Therefore, even if no evidence suggests defendants have hampered Jethroe
claimants' suits, equitable tolling is potentially applicable although equitable estoppel is not.
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injury through employment discrimination is, indeed, grave injurysufficiently grave to motivate Congress's attention a mere one year after
the civil war's conclusion in the form of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
and to spur Congress's enactment nearly one hundred years later of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the 1964 Act), an employment
discrimination statute that has, of all the 1964 Act's provisions,
"emerged as having the most significant impact in helping to shape the
228
legal and policy discourse on the meaning of equality."
While the injuries suffered by the Alexander plaintiffs and the Jethroe
claimants were different, whether injury involves physical or economic
damage is irrelevant to the equitable tolling inquiry. The relevant
question is whether plaintiffs were "prevented from [timely filing] due
to inequitable circumstances.,, 229 As discussed, supra, the circumstances
facing Jethroe and his contemporaries were certainly inequitable and
could well have prevented timely filing.
Whether circumstances remained sufficiently inequitable to justify
equitable tolling of the statute of limitations through the end of the
twentieth century and into the twenty-first century is a separate matter.
230
It is arguable that the Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of Education
decision in 1954 overruling Plessy, together with Congress enacting the
1964 Act, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of
1968, sufficiently altered America's societal landscape such that a
Jethroe claimant was no longer prevented from pursuing his claims.
Indeed, the defendants in the Alexander case made, and the Alexander
Court accepted, essentially this argument in concluding that the
equitable tolling doctrine initially tolled the statute of limitations for the
Alexander plaintiffs,
but that the tolling ceased with the legal reforms of
23 1
the 1960s.
Another view, however, would suggest these alterations in law did not
truly alter the nation's societal structure and that the inequitable
circumstances preventing Section 1981 suits remained for decades.
While the Alexander Court declined to adopt this view, the view is
eminently reasonable.232 As the Alexander plaintiffs argued, years of
race-based brutality, forced subservience, and second class status
understandably create-among those who have suffered the
228. Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty: A BriefLook at the Birth, Death, and Resurrection of the
Disparate Impact Theory of Discrimination,22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 431, 432-33 (2005) (citing
ROBERT BELTON ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUALITY
IN THE WORKPLACE 4 (2004)).

229.
230.
231.
232.

Rosner, 231 F. Supp. 2dat 1208.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Alexander, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5131, at *32.
See Malveaux, supra note 145, at 109-10.
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oppression-an enduring sense that "pressing [legal] claims would be
futile and possibly dangerous. 233 Plaintiffs may well "still suffer from
fear and intimidation long after the initial injury has occurred," and
indeed, "the oppressive conditions may continue to exist on a more
limited scale," thereby rendering impossible any serious attempt to
identify a bright-line date by which equitable tolling should cease.234
Applying the equitable tolling doctrine in Jethroe cases, and other
cases in which plaintiffs suffered their initial injuries in the Jim Crow
era, therefore, requires "a more nuanced approach"-an approach
recognizing barriers to suit born of Jim Crow era terrorism and inequity
that may last decades after the era's end.235 While no court has
heretofore adopted such an approach, the equitable tolling doctrine
provides courts the discretion to do so, and such an approach would
potentially shelter Jethroe claims from statutes of limitations dismissal.
It is clear, then, that the equitable tolling doctrine may, indeed,
reasonably serve to toll statutes of limitations for Jethroe claims. Once a
court makes this finding, it can move on to the nettlesome investigation
as to the appropriate duration of the tolling, an investigation that may or
may not result in a tolling sufficient to protect Jethroe claimants, but that
is enabled by the realization that equitable tolling is applicable to preCivil Rights era Section 1981 claims.
b. Continuing Violation
Under the continuing violations doctrine, "a claim, which otherwise
would be precluded because it is based on conduct which falls outside
the limitation period, may nonetheless be considered timely if there is a
'substantial nexus' between that conduct and conduct occurring within
the limitations period., 236 The continuing violation doctrine would,
therefore, appear to be a potential candidate for tolling the statute of
limitations against Jethroe claims. The discrimination that impacts an
employment relationship resulting in pension ineligibility or partial
pension eligibility certainly constitutes conduct falling within the
limitations period. And an employer's failure to provide a Jethroe
claimant (in his or her retirement) pension checks for which he or she
would have been eligible but for the discrimination may be deemed
conduct falling outside the limitations period, but with a "substantial
nexus" to the conduct occurring within the period.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. at 109.
Id. at 110.
Id.
Rosner v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1207 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
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While the Supreme Court has not historically granted the continuing
violations doctrine extensive treatment in its decisions, it has fleshed out
the doctrine to some extent. Unfortunately for Jethroe claimants, the
Court's most recent continuing violations decisions have narrowed the
doctrine's reach, thus potentially reducing its impact in the Jethroe
context.
For several years, the Court seemed to draw a distinction between
violations of law occurring in the past and continuing into the presentto which the continuing violations doctrine applied-and the present
impact of past violations, to which the continuing violations doctrine did
not apply. 237 However, in 1986, the Court arguably softened that
distinction and broadened application of the doctrine in the case of
Bazemore v. Friday.238 That case involved the North Carolina
Agricultural Extension Service (the Service), which, as a division of the
North Carolina State University's School of Agriculture and Life
Science, serves to disseminate "useful and practical information on
subjects relating to agriculture and home economics. 239
Prior to 1965, the Service consisted of two branches, the Negro
branch, which employed only black personnel, and the white branch,
which employed only white personnel.24 ° In light of the 1964 Act,
however, the Service merged its two branches into one in late 1965.241
Prior to the merger, there existed some disparities between salaries of
white branch employees and those of Negro branch employees
performing the same the job.24 2 Once the merger became complete,

however, the impact of the pre- 1965 discrimination lingered.243
A class of Service employees, recipients of its services, and others
filed suit in 1971 for unlawful discrimination in pay.2 44 After lengthy

lower court proceedings, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of
Appeals and found for plaintiffs, concluding, among other things, that
regardless of time elapsed from the initial discrimination, and whether in

237. See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977) ("[T]he emphasis should
not be placed on mere continuity; the critical question is whether any present violation exists."); Del.
State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980) ("[T]he proper focus [is] upon the time of the
discriminatory act, not upon the time at which the consequences of the act became most painful ....
238. 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
239. Id. at 388-89.
240. Id. at 390.
241. Id. at 390-91.
242. Id. at 394.
243. Id.
244. The United States intervened in 1972 with a complaint adding new causes of action,
including a Title VII cause of action, and essentially tracking the claims of the petitioners. Id. at 391.
Petitioners, then, amended their complaint to add a Title VII claim. Id.
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fact the cause of action existed at the time of the initial discrimination,
"[e]ach week's paycheck that delivers less to a black than to a similarly
situated white is ...

actionable." 245 The Bazemore decision seemed to

suggest, therefore, that if initial discrimination resulted in a pay disparity
and each check thereafter reflects the initial disparity, each check
effectuates the initial discrimination, and is thus discriminatory.
While the Court takes its analysis no further, a hypothetical illustrates
the logic seemingly motivating the decision. Consider a black person
who is discriminated against in Year X on the basis of race. Assume the
discrimination manifests in decreased salary, such that she receives
$20,000 per year in salary while her white counterpart receives $25,000
per year in salary for doing the same job. Further assume that going
forward the two employees receive race-blind year-end salary increases
of $1,000 per year. In Year X+10, the black employee will be salaried
at $30,000 per year and the white employee will be salaried at $35,000
per year. Despite race-blind salary increases, and thus no new
discriminatory act bearing on salary, the black employee will receive
less per year and less in each paycheck than her white colleague on the
basis of race and for no other reason. Under Bazemore, it would seem,
the black employee in question would be able to rely on the continuing
violations doctrine in bringing action in Year X+10 for the
discriminatory salary determination in Year X. And this would appear
the correct result, for, in the alternative, the black employee would
receive less pay in every check based solely on her race and would have
no remedy.
Jethroe claimants might argue that they, like the above-described
hypothetical black employee, suffered discrimination in employment
based on race. Whereas the hypothetical black employee was given a
discriminatorily low salary, Jethroe claimants might argue they were
discriminated against in some other manner, such as unwarranted
demotion or termination, which rendered them ineligible for a pension in
retirement. And whereas the hypothetical black employee years later
experienced the perpetuation of that discrimination in each inequitably
devalued paycheck, Jethroe claimants can argue they experienced the
perpetuation of the discrimination each time their former employer
failed to provide a periodic pension payment. The continuing violation
doctrine demands that "the limitations period for a continuing offense
does not begin until the offense is complete., 246 Each non-issued
pension payment would, under this argument, reveal the offense which
245. Id. at 395-96.
246. Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117, 134 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting United States
v. Rivera-Ventura, 72 F.3d 277, 281 (2d Cir. 1995)).
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the Jethroe claimant suffered to be not yet complete, and therefore,
under the continuing violations doctrine, the time during which Jethroe
claimants could bring suit should extend into the period during which
they should have been, but for the discrimination, receiving pension
payments.
Considering application of the continuing violations doctrine in the
context of a claim for restorative racial justice is not novel. Indeed, in
Cato v. United States, the first modem claim for reparations in federal
court, the Ninth Circuit conceded the doctrine's propriety as a tool for
seeking to toll statutes of limitations. 247 In that case, several pro se
plaintiffs sued the U.S. government for damages resulting from slavery
and post-slavery discrimination.24 8 The district court dismissed the
claim, noting that plaintiffs identified no violated constitutional or
statutory right, thus stating no cause of action, and that plaintiffs
asserted neither a basis for subject matter jurisdiction nor a waiver of
sovereign immunity.249
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit entertained plaintiffs' argument that a
statute of limitations could be tolled by the continuing violations
doctrine as a reasonable and appropriate argument, but it did not reach
the issue of timeliness, having already concluded plaintiffs did not
establish a basis upon which to sue the United States.250 The Court
explained that the continuing violations doctrine was useless to plaintiffs
unless the plaintiffs could, in fact, "sue the United States for the acts
complained of."'25' It follows from Cato, then, that if plaintiffs were
able to obtain waiver and sue the government, or like Jethroe, sue a
private entity, thus avoiding the sovereign immunity problem altogether,
the continuing violations doctrine would be a legitimate candidate for
use in tolling the statue of limitations. And it proved to be.
Indeed, five years after Cato, in the aforementioned Bodner v. Banque
Paribas case, Jewish plaintiffs asserted in federal court claims for
damages arising from French financial institutions' expropriation of
their assets during the World War II Nazi occupation of France.2 52 The
Court accepted plaintiffs' argument that, under the continuing violations
doctrine, their claim for damages stemming from the World War II era
abuses was timely. 253 Although the taking occurred decades earlier, the

247. Cato v.United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 1995).
248. Id. at 1105-06.
249. Id. at 1106-07.

250. See id. at 1108-09.
251. Id.at 1109.
252. 114 F.Supp. 2d 117, 121 (E.D.N.Y.2000).
253. Id. at 134-35.
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deprivation plaintiffs suffered in the form of the continued withholding
of assets, constituted an actionable continuing violation. 254 Nothing new
was taken, but the Court determined that defendant's subsequent failure
to provide the previously seized assets sufficed to extend the time period
for filing.255 Like the Bodner plaintiffs, Jethroe claimants would be able
to demonstrate an initial violation and the defendant's subsequent failure
to provide them benefits to which they should be entitled.
Despite what appears a promising foundation, a continuing violations
argument in the Jethroe claim context would face difficulty. First, the
Bodner court explained, "The circumstances meriting application of the
continuing violation exception must be compelling., 256 While the
circumstances giving life to a Jethroe claim, are, as discussed above,
seemingly compelling, the Bodner court appeared to view the
defendant's "repeated denials of information" related to the withheld
assets as the compelling circumstances sufficient to prompt the
doctrine's application in that case. 257 The Bodner court did not explicate
that such information denial is necessary to trigger the continuing
violations doctrine, but if a court found it to be, only Jethroe claimants
able to prove such information denial could gain shelter under the
doctrine.
Of even greater concern to a potential Jethroe claimant, however, is
the impact the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in National Railroad
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan258 and Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. 259 have had on the continuing violations doctrine. In
Morgan, a 2002 case, Abner Morgan filed a Title VII racial
discrimination claim against his employer, Amtrak, citing some
discriminatory acts which occurred within the timely filing period and
some which fell outside the timely filing period. 260 Amtrak won
summary judgment as to the untimely claims at the district court level,
but the Ninth Circuit reversed on continuing violation grounds, finding
that "a plaintiff can establish a continuing violation that allows recovery
for claims filed outside of the statutory period . . . .[by showing] 'a
series of related
acts one or more of which are within the limitations
26 1
period.'
254. Id.
255. See id.
256. Id. at 134.
257. Id.
258. 536 U.S. 101 (2002).

259. 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
260. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 105-06.
261. Id. at 106-07 (quoting Morgan v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 232 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir.
2000), affgd in part and rev 'd in part, 536 U.S. 101 (2002)).

834

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol.76

On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision
and found for Amtrak, holding, among other things, that "discrete
discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are
related to acts alleged in timely filed charges. 262 A Jethroe claimant's
continuing violations argument would be that each non-issuance of a
pension check is an act related to the initial discriminatory employment
decision rendering the claimant ineligible and is thus a continuation of
the initial discrimination. As such, the Supreme Court's Morgan
decision, which is, as a consequence of its reasoning, widely viewed as
restricting the continuing violations doctrine's application largely to
hostile work environment claims, 263 would seem to significantly weaken
that argument.
The Court's 2007 Ledbetter decision deals the argument an even more
crippling blow. In that case, plaintiff Lily Ledbetter sued the Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Company under Title VII for sex discrimination in
compensation. 2 6 She alleged that several of her supervisors had given
her negative performance evaluations because of her sex and, because
employees' salary raises were based on their performance evaluations,
her compensation was discriminatorily suppressed.265 In making her
argument, she relied heavily on Bazemore, which, as noted supra, held
that "each week's paycheck that delivers less to a black than to a
similarly situated white is ...actionable. 266
The Court, however, rejected Ledbetter's interpretation of Bazemore
and, therefore, her continuing violations argument. The Court found
that the passage upon which Ledbetter relies, and upon which a Jethroe
claimant would likely rely, stands for the proposition "that when an
employer adopts a facially discriminatory pay structure that puts some
employees on a lower scale because of race, the employer engages in
intentional discrimination whenever it issues a check to one of these
disfavored employees. 26 7 Since the initial discrimination of which
Ledbetter complained was not consequent to a policy of giving women
negative evaluations, but rather was consequent to a supervisor's
individual decision within the context of an evaluation "system that
[was] 'facially nondiscriminatory and neutrally applied,"' the Court

262. Id. at H13.
263. See Amanda J. Zaremba, Casenote, National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan: The Filing
Quandaryfor Legally Ill-Equipped Employees and Eternally Liable Employers, 72 U. CN. L. REV.

1129, 1153-54 (2004).
264. Ledbetter, 127 S.Ct. at 2165.
265. Id. at 2165-66.
266. Id. at 2172 (quoting Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395 (1986)).
267. Id. at 2173.
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268
concluded Bazemore did not support her claim.
Sam Jethroe, and Jethroe claimants generally, as defined in this
Article, would not claim the existence of a discriminatory pension
system, but rather they would claim adverse employment actions, the
consequence of which rendered them ineligible for an otherwise
"facially nondiscriminatory and neutral[]" pension policy. 269 As such,
their reliance on Bazemore, together with Bodner, would likely yield
them the same result Ledbetter suffered.27 °
The continuing violations doctrine is, therefore, ultimately an unlikely
candidate to protect a Jethroe claim against statutes of limitations
dismissal.

c. Discovery Rule
The discovery rule offers Jethroe claimants another option for
shielding their claims from statute of limitations attacks. Under the rule,
"a plaintiffs claim does not accrue until the plaintiff knows, or in the
exercise of reasonable diligence should know, of certain facts underlying
the claim. ' '271 The rule sprouts from basic principles of fairness. 272 The
268. Id. at 2174 (quoting Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 911 (1989)). It bears
noting the decision in Lorance was superceded by statute through the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, the purpose of which was "to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the
scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of
discrimination." Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(4), 105 Stat. 1071.
269. A plaintiff able to establish he or she was denied a pension pursuant to a discriminatory
pension system might fare better under Ledbetter. The Ledbetter Court, however, makes clear
Ledbetter's claim is distinguishable from the claims dismissed in Morgan only in that it alleges
discriminatory salary adjustment-the precise issues at play in the Bazemore case-suggesting perhaps
that a case not specifically regarding salary adjustment would lose under Morgan without discussion.
See Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2174.
270. A Jethroe claimant might seek to distinguish the Ledbetter case and, indeed, the Morgan case
on the grounds that both cases dealt with Title VII claims while the Jethroe claim is a § 1981 claim.
This distinction, however, would work to little effect. First, as noted, a Jethroe claimant's continuing
violations argument would rely upon Bazemore, which was itself a Title VII case. Second, in that Title
VII claims and § 1981 claims are often pleaded together and interpreted by courts in a similar manner,
see Judith J. Johnson, A Uniform Standardfor Exemplary Damages in Employment Discrimination
Cases, 33 U. RICH.L. REV. 41, 58 (1999) ("Because § 1981 and Title VII provide different remedies for
the same wrong, they are often considered together ....), a court would not likely shield a Jethroe
claim from the weight of Ledbetter simply because the Jethroe claim invoked § 1981 instead of Title
VII. In fact, distinguishing a Jethroe claim as such might weaken the continuing violations argument
from a policy perspective, as the continuing violations doctrine developed in the Title VII, rather than
the § 1981, context as a response to Title VII's uniquely short filing period of 180 or 300 days. See
Federal Statutes and Regulations, B. Civil Rights Act, 116 HARV. L. REV. 352, 356Leading Cases, Ill.
57 (2002) ("The [continuing violations] doctrine is partly the product of Title VII's comparatively short
filing deadline: whereas Title VII claims must be filed with the EEOC within 180 (or 300) days,
").
individuals bringing a tort claim can usually wait two or three years ....
271. James R. MacAyeal, The Discovery Rule and the Continuing Violation Doctrine as
Exceptions to the Statute of Limitations for Civil Environmental Penalty Claims, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
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theory is that a person should not be required to pursue a claim during a
particular time window if the person has no knowledge of the basis of
the cause of action during that time window. 273 Courts tend not to apply
the discovery rule in cases in which the injury is immediately evident,
because under such circumstances immediate discovery is assumed.
Rather, Courts deem the rule applicable when an injury is "not
immediately evident or not readily discernible. 2 74 And in assessing
whether a claim is readily discernable such that the discovery rule
applies, courts are more likely to apply the rule when there exists "a
significant disparity in the ability of the plaintiff, as compared to the
defendant, to become aware of critical information necessary to know
that a wrong has occurred. 275
The discovery rule was born in the personal injury context. In 1949,
the United States Supreme Court entertained the case of Urie v.
Thompson, which involved a suit brought by Tom Urie, a firefighter
employed by Missouri Pacific Railroad, against his employer.2 76 During
his working tenure from 1910 to 1940, Urie spent substantial time riding
in steam locomotives and during that time contracted a pulmonary
disease called silicosis from emissions he was forced to breathe in the
locomotives' cabs.2 77 By 1940, he lost his ability to work and, after
being diagnosed, filed suit arguing that the railroad subjected him to air
contaminated with substances it knew or should have known to be
harmful.2 78 The matter reached the Supreme Court where the railroad
asserted, as it had in lower court proceedings, that the applicable threeyear statute of limitations expired in 1913, three years after Urie began
suffering his injury. 279 The Court, however, concluded the statute of
limitations had not run, noting Urie had no knowledge of his

589, 595 (1996).
272. Gregory G. Gordon, Comment, Adult Survivors of ChildhoodSexual Abuse and the Statute of
Limitations: The Need for Consistent Application of the Delayed Discovery Rule, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 1359,

1375 (1993).
273. See id.
274. MacAyeal, supra note 271, at 596. While some courts have indicated the discovery rule is
only applicable when a claim is "inherently unknowable," such a formulation would eviscerate the rule,
as no inherently unknowable claim could ever be known and, therefore, asserted. Id. at 595-96. It
would be irrational for a Court to render a rule meaningless through the standard it applies in conducting
its analysis as to the rule's applicability, so "inherently knowable" language is generally deemed to
equate to the "not immediately evident or not readily discernible" language many courts employ. Id. at
596.
275. Id. at 596-97.
276. 337 U.S. 163, 165 (1949).
277. Id. at 165-66.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 168-69.
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employment-related ailment until his diagnosis. 280 The Court found that
because Urie did not know, and had no reason to know, that he was
developing an employment-related injury during this tenure, depriving
him his cause of action on statute of limitations grounds would be unjust
and could not be "reconciled with the traditional purposes of statutes of
limitations, which conventionally require the assertion of claims within a
specified period of time after notice of the invasion of. .. rights. 281
Indeed, under such circumstances, the policy justifications for statutes of
limitations fall flat.
Since Urie, the discovery rule has expanded beyond the realm of
occupational diseases and has seen increasing application.2 82 While the
rule is now most closely associated with medical malpractice and
products liability cases,28 3 it is by no means limited to those areas of the
law. As the rule has developed, some courts have applied it when a
plaintiff suffers an injury that is not easily detectable, without regard to
some courts have found the
the area of law implicated.28 4 Indeed, 285
discovery rule applicable to all civil cases.
While perhaps applicable to all civil cases, unfortunately for Jethroe
claimants, the rule only rarely salvages a claimant's otherwise timebarred claim in the employment discrimination context because courts
have found time begins to run for statutes of limitations purposes when
plaintiffs know or should know they are injured and know or should
know the injury is a result of their employer's conduct.2 86 Whether the
adverse employment decision is demotion, negative evaluation, salary
reduction, or termination, the impacted employee generally knows or
should know of the injury and almost certainly knows the identity of the
party inflicting it, i.e., the employer.2 87
at169.
280. Id.
281.

Id.at 170.

282. MacAyeal, supra note 271, at 602.
283. See Gordon, supra note 272, at 1376.
284. MacAyeal, supra note 271, at 601.
285. Id.

286. Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1386 (3d Cir. 1994).
287. The rare circumstance in which an employment discrimination plaintiff is aware of an injury
but unaware of the party causing the injury is illustrated by Weinandt v. Kraft Pizza Co., 217 F. Supp.
2d 923 (E.D. Wis. 2002). In that case, Anthony Weinandt interviewed for a job with Kraft Pizza
Company (Kraft) and several days later was informed he would not be hired. Id. at 926. Three weeks
thereafter, in March of 2000, he filed state and federal anti-discrimination charges against Kraft. Id.
Kraft, however, did not conduct the hiring for the position Weinandt sought, but rather contracted with
Seaton Corporation, a personnel company, to do it. Id. Weinandt did not learn of Seaton's involvement
until after the filing period. Id. The Court found that because "plaintiff knew that he had been injured
in March 2000, [but] did not learn until mid-September 2001 that his injury had been caused by Seaton,"
the discovery ruled demanded the statute of limitations governing his claim not begin to run until that
realization. Id. at 928.
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A Jethroe claimant, however, might seize upon two areas of relative
uncertainty in the discovery rule doctrine to press a case for its
application. The first regards what it means to know of an injury.
Courts are divided as to whether an employee's knowledge of the actual
adverse employment action triggers the statute of limitations to run or
whether an employee's realization that the injury was consequent to
unlawful discrimination triggers its running.2 88 Under the former
interpretation, Jethroe claimants are unlikely to prevail as they almost
certainly would have known of the adverse employment action they
suffered when they suffered it. It is, however, quite possible they would
not have known it to be illegal, particularly in light of rampant Jim
Crow-era discrimination and Section 1981's infrequent application.
Thus, under the latter interpretation, perhaps the statute of limitations
should not start running until the Jethroe claimant would, or should,
have known of the adverse action's illegality. Under that circumstance,
the discovery rule might serve to preserve an otherwise untimely claim.
Assuming a Jethroe claimant knew the adverse employment action
suffered stemmed from unlawful discrimination, the Jethroe claimant
might argue, alternatively, that the injury at the heart of the suit is not
the known adverse employment action, but the injury flowing from that
adverse employment action-the pension ineligibility, of which the
Jethroe claimant neither knew nor had reason to know until discovering
former colleagues were receiving pensions and the Jethroe claimant was
not. The argument would seemingly find support in a line of reasoning
most fully explored in Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co. 289 In that case, a
Kodak employee received several poor employment evaluations which
she believed to be racially motivated, but was not discharged from her
employment until years later. 290 She brought legal action after the
firing, and while the defendant argued that the allegedly discriminatory
evaluations were too remote to form the basis of a discrimination suit,
the Court expressed greater concern with the timing of consequences
flowing from the initial injury than with the timing of the initial injury
itself.291 Finding for the plaintiff, the First Circuit held the limitations
period should not ' begin
to run until "the implications [of the evaluation]
292
have crystallized.

288. See JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN
DISCRIMINATION 437 (5th ed. 2001).

& GEORGE M. STRICKLER, THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT

289. 183 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999). See also Colgan v Fisher Scientific Co., 935 F.2d 1407 (3d Cir.
1991); Johnson v. Gen. Elec., 840 F.2d 132 (1st Cir. 1988).
290. Thomas, 183 F.3d at 45-46.
291. See id. at 54.
292. Id. at 50 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson, 840 F.2d at 136-37).
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Seizing upon this reasoning, a Jethroe claimant might argue that the
denied pension payments are the crystallized implications of the earlier
adverse employment action and, therefore, the pension non-payment,
and nothing else, should trigger the statute's running. It is not clear,
however, that the First Circuit's reasoning reaches quite so far. Indeed,
any analysis of the Jethroe claimant's argument would occur against the
backdrop of the general rule the Supreme Court articulated in Delaware
State College v. Ricks regarding accrual: "The proper focus is upon the
time of the discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the
consequences of the acts became most painful. 293 To the extent the
Eastman Kodak case crafted out an exception to this Ricks rule, the
Court seemed to focus on the evaluation context in particular, a context
in which a plaintiff might reasonably take no action, as the evaluation
may well never have tangible effects. Other adverse employment
actions such as demotion, salary reduction, and termination tend to have
obvious and immediate tangible effects. In that an adverse employment
action other than a negative evaluation typically results in "some
tangible effects of the discrimination ... apparent to the plaintiff, ' 294 the

Eastman Kodak reasoning may not extend beyond the evaluation context
and thus may not prove generally helpful to Jethroe claimants.
So, while the discovery rule, like the equitable tolling and continuing
violations doctrines, may aid a Jethroe claimant's cause, depending on
the circumstances of the claim, it may, like those doctrines, be of no
help.
Indeed, in light of the Alexander Court's refusal to equitably toll
delayed racial justice claims beyond the 1960's and the post-Bodner
evisceration of the continuing violations doctrine, absent circumstances
allowing discovery rule application, a Jethroe claimant may be unable to
rely upon the common law in fending off a statutes of limitations
defense.
2. Legislative Action
Occasionally, if sufficiently grievous and renowned, a wrong enjoys a
remedy outside of the judicial system, often in the form of legislative
action. For instance, in 1994, seventy-one years after a mob of white
policemen and others torched the small black community of Rosewood,
Florida and killed six of its residents in a race riot, the Florida legislature
voted to compensate the riot's living survivors as well as its decedents'
293. Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980) (alteration in original) (quoting
Abramson v. Univ. of Haw., 594 F.2d 202, 209 (9th Cir. 1979).
294. Thomas, 183 F.3d at 50 (quotingJohnson, 840 F.2d at 137).
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descendents.29 5 The U.S. Congress took similar steps to compensate
Japanese Americans interned during World War 11.296 Such legislative
action is, however, rare, and in that legislatures disperse public funds,
such action, when taken, generally works to remedy publicly, as
opposed to privately, inflicted wrongs.2 97 Such action, therefore, is
unlikely to remedy the wrongs Jethroe claimants have endured.29 8
Legislative action, however, need not be compensatory to preserve
the possibly of a remedy for Jethroe claimants. "The shelter of statutes
of limitations [of course] ... has come into law by legislative grace, not
as a natural right., 299 And just as statutes of limitations exist by virtue
of legislative enactment, legislative enactment can prevent their
application. As noted above, per se exceptions to statutes of limitations
application exist in a variety of realms. These exceptions are the work
of legislatures. While legislative action to compensate Jethroe claimants
is unlikely, legislative action to free their claims from statutes of
limitations application seems more feasible. The latter action would not
require appropriation of public funds to individuals claiming pension
deprivation as a consequence of decades old race-based employment

295. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Repairing the Past: New Efforts in the Reparations Debate in
America, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 307-08 (2003). See also FLA. STAT. § 1009.55 (2007)
(setting up a scholarship program for minorities with special preference given to direct descendants of
the Rosewood families).
296. See Jack Greenberg, Reparations: Politically Inconceivable, 29 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 157,
157 (2007). See also 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989b-4 (2000).
297. The rarity of such action, even regarding publicly inflicted wrongs, is highlighted by the
heretofore failed attempts to secure legislative reparations for the victims of the Tulsa riots and their
descendants. Despite the incontrovertible evidence of carnage and destruction at the hands of public
officials, the Oklahoma state legislature has done nothing to compensate those who, but for the statute of
limitations, would almost certainly be entitled to legal remedy. See Alexander v. Oklahoma, No. 03-C133-E, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5131, at *33 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 19, 2004), affd, 382 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir.
2004) ("Moreover, nothing in the Commission Report is binding on the legislature, and there is no
evidence that the Oklahoma Legislature has promised to pay restitution or reparations to the race riot
survivors.").
The United States Congress has been no more willing to legislate reparations for AfricanAmericans than has the Oklahoma legislature. Since 1989, Congressman John Conyers of Michigan has
annually introduced a bill titled, "Commission to Study Reparation Proposals for African-Americans
Act." Ogletree, supra note 112, at 25 (citing Commission to Study Reparations Proposals for AfricanAmericans Act, H.R. 40, 108th Cong. (2003)). Although the bill does not seek to legislate reparations,
but merely to study the possibility of doing so, it "has been defeated every year since its introduction."
Ogletree, supra note 112, at 25.
298. Indeed, United States Senator Bill Nelson of Florida failed to gamer support for his
resolution, S. Res. 228, 108th Cong. (2003), which essentially called for a recognition of Negro League
players' achievements and for MLB to reach "a fair compensation agreement with former players of the
Negro Baseball Leagues who were excluded under Major League Baseball's 1997 pension plan." S.
Res. 228 [108th]: A Resolution Recognizing the Teams and Players of the Negro Baseball Leagues,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?tab=summary&bill=sr108-228 (last visited Feb. 18, 2008).
299. Malveaux, supra note 145, at 92.
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discrimination. Rather, it would extricate such claims from the statutes
of limitations yoke. Jethroe claimants' former employers would not be
ordered to compensate the plaintiffs, but would simply be required to
respond to their claims on the merits. The legislature would essentially
be saying, "as strongly as we may desire finality, we desire justice even
Jethroe claimants is an unacceptable
more, 30 and denial of justice for
30 1
finality.
of
name
the
in
sacrifice
If Congress enacted such legislation, it would be doing so with strong
historical precedent. Indeed, Congress has previously done for Native
Americans with delayed justice claims, what this Article proposes it
could do for African-Americans with Jethroe claims.30 2 In passing the
Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946 (ICCA), Congress provided a

mechanism for Native Americans to assert "claims in law or equity
arising under the Constitution, laws, [or] treaties of the United States" to
which

statute

of

limitations

defenses

were

impermissible.3 °3

300. Chaplin, supra note 137, at 1588.
301. Notably, Congressman Conyers has proposed such legislation as a means of providing the
Tulsa race riot's survivors and decedents' descendents a day in court. On April 23, 2007, he introduced
the "Tulsa-Greenwood Race Riot Claims Accountability Act of 2007," which would "provide a
mechanism for a determination on the merits of the claims brought by survivors and descendants of the
victims of the Tulsa, Oklahoma Race Riot of 1921 but who were denied that determination." TulsaGreenwood Race Riot Claims Accountability Act of 2007, H.R. 1995 100th Cong (2007). Specifically,
the legislation would proclaim timely any Tulsa claimant's suit brought within five years from the date
of the legislation's enactment. See id.
302. Consideration of an analog in the African-American context to legislation designed to
support Native Americans' delayed justice claims is not unprecedented. Nearly forty years ago, New
York University Law Professor Graham Hughes wrote:
If a proper sense of shame at our forerunners' dealings with the Indians prompted the Act
of 1946, can we feel any less sense of shame at their dealings with the black population
of America? ...[And] if a public confession can be made in statutory form of the just
claims of American Indians for compensation . ..why should we not initiate similar
schemes for reparation to black Americans?
Graham Hughes, Reparationsfor Blacks?, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (1968).
Although Hughes ultimately concludes such a reparations scheme would be facially
infeasible, his analysis considers claims characteristic of distributional social welfare reparations, rather
than reparations designed to do justice under plaintiffs' particular facts. See id. In that Jethroe claims, if
viewed as reparations claims, must certainly be what Hylton has coined "doing justice" reparations
analogous legislation in the Jethroe context would seem a reasonable
claims, see supra Part III.B.,
possibility.
303. Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, ch. 959, § 2(1), 60 Stat. 1049, 1050 (repealed 1978).
Under the statute, plaintiffs were entitled to bring their claims before the Indian Claims Commission for
resolution and, so long as the claims were filed with the Commission within five years of the ICCA's
enactment, statute of limitations defenses were inapplicable. Id. § 2. The Commission's decisions were
appealable to the Court of Claims and ultimately to the United States Supreme Court. Patrick W.
Wandres, Note, Indian Land Claims: Sherrill and the Impending Legacy of the Doctrine of Laches, 31
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 131, 134 (2006-2007).
It bears noting that while the ICCA initially "held out much promise," "it failed to meet the
expectations of nearly everyone involved in its creation." Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims for
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Recognizing the injustice to which Native Americans have been
subjected in this nation and the difficulty of bringing timely claims to
remedy those injustices, Congress legislated a statute of limitations
exception, which provided disenfranchised plaintiffs a taste of justice.
30 5
Congress could certainly do the same in the Jethroe context.
3. Prevailing upon Professional Responsibility
In the absence of a legislative exception to statutes of limitations
application in the Jethroe claim context, defense lawyers should be
encouraged to advise their clients against pleading statutes of limitations
defenses in the Jethroe claim context. While this proposal may, at first
blush, appear radical, an examination of current scholarship regarding
the lawyer's role, together with an exploration of the American legal
system's foundations, attests to its reasonability.
In considering the lawyer's professional role, Law Professor Michael
Krauss, turns his attention to 1991, a landmark year in any endeavor to
explore the state of the legal profession.30 6 In that year, a Johns Hopkins
University study revealed that among 104 professions analyzed, lawyers
were most likely to consider committing suicide, most likely to regret
entering their profession, and least likely to desire that their children
take up their profession.30 7 In that same year, Newsweek published an
essay a Colorado-based attorney named Sam Benson penned, entitled
Why I Quit Practicing Law, which sheds light upon the broad-based
disenchantment. 308 Benson writes:
The code of ethics states that an attorney must zealously represent his or
her client ....
In practice, this creates a warlike atmosphere for attorneys
Reparations, Compensation, and Restitution in the United States Legal System, in WHEN SORRY ISN'T
ENOUGH: THE CONTROVERSY OVER APOLOGIES AND REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN INJUSTICE 261, 262-63

(Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999). The failure sprung largely from administrative and procedural foibles, as
well as a focus on monetary compensation above land restoration and other non-monetary relief. See id.
at 263-66 ("The idea was not merely to transfer money to all tribes, but to tailor justice in light of each
tribe's history.").
304. See United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39, 45 (1985) ("The Indian Claims Commission Act had
two purposes. The 'chief purpose of the [Act was] to dispose of the Indian claims problem with
finality."') (citations omitted).
305. The ICCA differs from legislation Jethroe claimants would desire in one principal respectthe ICCA provides for suit against the United States government rather than private parties. See
Wandres, supra note 303, at 134. There is no reason, however, that such legislation, passed in the
Jethroe claim context, need be similarly restrictive.
306. Michael I. Krauss, The Lawyer as Limo: A BriefHistory of the Hired Gun, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 325, 329 (2001).
307. Id. at 330.
308. See id. at 329.
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in which they are pressured by clients to win at any cost and by any
means available ....

Many attorneys believe that "zealously representing

their clients" means pushing all rules
309 of ethics and decency to the limit.
The sad thing is, they may be right.
They may, indeed, be right. But they may be wrong. The very
foundations of the American legal profession suggest the latter. The
European legal traditions upon which the American legal profession is
based demanded that legal representation be overlaid with a moral
sensibility. 310 The lawyer was to be "supportive of client autonomy but
protective of the collective morality," and in that context, the hired
gun
311
of whom Sam Benson wrote, "would be a dysfunctional lawyer."
David Hoffman's and George Sharswood's works on the legal
professional in the early and mid-nineteenth century reveal that the
lawyer's role as protector of the public morality endured at least through
the start of the civil war.31 2 As Krauss explains, "For Sharswood, the
duties of the lawyer to the client and to moral value exist in
harmony. 313 Indeed, Sharswood was fond of the following "poetic ode
to the lawyer's credo" by Sir William Blackstone:
To Virtue and her friends a friend
Still may my voice the weak defend
Ne'er may my prostituted tongue
Protect the oppressor in his wrong:
Nor wrest the spirit of the laws,
To sanctify the villain's cause.3 14

Hoffman, even more unyielding than Sharswood in his "contention
that representation of clients in no way absolves lawyers from the
dictates of conscience," drafted the famous Fifty Resolutions in Regard
to Professional Deportment to set forth his view of the lawyer's
professional role.315 Hoffman's resolutions are particularly notable in
that they reveal the extent to which applying the statute of limitations
defense requires a moral judgment. Indeed, one of Hoffman's
309. Id. (quoting Sam Benson, Why I Quit PracticingLaw, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 4, 1991, at 10.).
310. Seeid. at 327-29.
311. Id. at 328, 329.
312. While some scholarship suggests divergence between these two scholars' view of
professional responsibility, in that Sharswood gave "more weight to the client's wishes than would
Hoffman," Krauss argues they are more similar in perspective than different. See id. at 332-33.
313. Id. at 333.
314. Id. at 333-34 (quoting GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 75-76
(T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1854)).
315. Id. at 332.
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resolutions explains that if his client "acknowledged a plaintiffs civil
claim," 316 he would never "plead the Statute of Limitations, when based
on mere efflux of time." 317
Even in the absence of such an
acknowledgment, Hoffman suggests, the statute of limitations defense
among others should not, under some circumstances, be pressed.
Hoffman writes, "If, after duly examining a case, I am persuaded that
my client's claim or defence (as the case may be ... ) cannot, or rather
3 18
ought not, to be sustained, I will promptly advise him to abandon it."
Hoffman was not idiosyncratic in his concern about the ethics involved
in asserting a statute of limitations defense. Indeed, through the early
twentieth century, "one of the great ethical debates in professional
circles concerned how ... lawyer[s] should counsel [their] clients about
pleading the Statute of Limitations." 319 Legal Scholar M. H. Hoeflich
explains that these lawyers tested their ethical compasses with the
following hypothetical:320
Assume a client comes to you and tells you that he contracted a valid debt
ten years ago. His creditor has now died and had, during his life, failed to
collect the debt he owed. Your client's creditor's widow now finds
herself in difficult financial circumstances which would be greatly
improved if she could collect the debt. Should you, as a lawyer, counsel
your client to plead the Statute of32 Limitations
and, thereby, avoid paying
1
what was otherwise a valid debt?
The answer to the question for many of the lawyers who considered it,
was simply no.322
The context in which Hoffman and Sharswood wrote, and which
Hoeflich describes, however, has, of course, shifted. Indeed, "modem
conceptions of zealous advocacy vary considerably from the limits to

316. Id. (quoting 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY: ADDRESSED TO STUDENTS
AND THE PROFESSION GENERALLY 754 (Baltimore, Joseph Neal, 2d ed. 1836)).

317. 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY: ADDRESSED TO STUDENTS AND THE
PROFESSION GENERALLY 754 (Baltimore, Joseph Neal, 2d ed. 1836) (emphasis added).
318. Id. (emphasis added).
319. M. H. Hoeflich, The "Good Lawyer" & Rule 2.1, J. KAN. B. ASS'N, June/July 2000, at 38,
40.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. Professor Larry Gantt notes, however, that some evidence indicates the "golden age of
ethical lawyering may be illusionary," suggesting current scholars may, to some extent, idealize the
approach their predecessors in the law took to plying their profession. Larry 0. Natt Gantt II,
Integration as Integrity: Postmodernism, Psychology, and Religion on the Role of Moral Counseling in
the Attorney-Client Relationship, 16 REGENT U. L. REV. 233, 237 n.24 (2003-2004) (quoting Robert
Granfield & Thomas Koenig, "It'sHard to be A Human Being and A Lawyer": Young Attorneys and the
Confrontation with Ethical Ambiguity in Legal Practice, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 495, 499 n. 15 (2003)).
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such advocacy accepted in the nineteenth century. ' 323 The shift
occurred gradually as the bar expanded during the post-Civil War era
and began developing rules to govern those among its ranks. 324 While
the first state ethics codes furthered, in large part, Hoffman's vision of
the lawyer as accountable to the collective moral good,3 25 the ABA's
Ethical Canons of 1908, the first nationwide code of ethics, reflected a
fierce tension as to attorneys' lawyering obligations: "two visions of
legal ethics stood opposed to one another: one asserting the united
metaphysical and epistemological necessity of ethical obligation, and the
other denying the existence
of any normative system not enacted by
326
force."
by
backed
someone
Today's codes of professional legal ethics-the Model Rules, which
apply in forty-one of the nation's state jurisdictions, and the Model
Code, which applies in the other nine-retain some of the tension
imbedded in the Ethical Canons of 1908, but do seem to "tilt in favor of
the 'hired gun"' and away from Hoffman's vision of the morally
327
obligated attorney.
This shift, however, cannot alone account for the decrease of moral or
other non-legal client counseling, as the contemporary guideposts for
lawyers' professional comportment, while certainly far removed from
the mores of the nineteenth century, leave room for such counseling.
For instance, Model Rule 2.1 reads: "Inrepresenting a client, a lawyer
shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid
advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to
other considerations such as moral, economic, social, and political
factors, that [sic] may be relevant to the client's situation., 328 Similarly,
the ABA's Lawyers' Manual on ProfessionalConduct states "a lawyer's
recommendations arguably should go beyond advising the client about
that which is merely legally permissible and ought to incorporate moral
and ethical considerations as well. 3 29 The American Law Institute's
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers speaks to the same
effect.3 3 °
So, while the common conception of the lawyer's role and the codes
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

Gantt, supranote 322, at 237.
Krauss, supra note 306, at 335-36.
See id.
Id. at 336-37.
Id. at 338.
Gantt, supra note 322, at 235 (alteration in original) (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L

CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2003)).

329. Id. (quoting ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 31:701 (1998)
(emphasis added)).
330. See id. at 236.
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reflecting it have shifted over the past 200 years, they have not shifted so
as to prohibit moral and other non-legal counseling. The movement
away from such counseling, according to Krauss and fellow law
professor Larry Gantt II, is attributable largely to increased fiscal
pressure on attorneys, an increasingly morally nihilistic American
populous, and a host of other causes, which have motivated a hired gun
approach to lawyering, but which decidedly do not mandate such an
approach.33'
And, indeed, perhaps the two most thorough explorations of legal
ethics in the past thirty years, David Luban's Lawyers and Justice: An
Ethical Study and William Simon's The Practiceof Justice, take strong
exception to the hired gun model.
In Lawyers and Justice, Luban seeks to defend the law "against a
professional vision based only on client service and the bottom line"
through "urging a professional ethic" that might guide lawyers in their
decision making. 332 Luban does so by considering the interaction
between "role morality," which he describes as "the special obligations
attached to certain social roles," and "common morality," a morality that
binds all persons. 333 Luban recognizes the importance of role morality,
but insists lawyers view it within the context of, and generally not allow
it to supersede, the greater common morality. 334 The moral lawyer, as
Luban sees it, therefore, "will challenge her client if the representation
seems to her morally unworthy; she may cajole or negotiate with the
client to change the ends or means; she may find herself compelled to
that the client will view as betrayal; and she will not fear
initiate action
335
to quit.
Faced with Hoeflich's "destitute widow" hypothetical set out above,
therefore, Luban's moral lawyer would counsel the client against
pleading the statute of limitations defense.33 6 William Simon purports to
331. Krauss, supra note 306, at 339-40; Gantt, supra note 322, at 238-48.
332. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY, at xvii-xviii (1988).

333. Id. at 105.
334. See id. at 104-47. Notably, Luban concedes role morality may trump common morality in
the criminal law context: "The criminal defense lawyer is one of the clearest cases of a role occupant
who will often find that the justifications of the role are so crucial that they override all but the most
stringent demands of common morality." Id. at 145.
335. Id. at xxii. Robert Cochran notes that Luban and others espousing moral activism tend to
engage factually unambiguous situations in which what is "morally unworthy" is entirely clear.
Symposium: Client Counseling and Moral Responsibility, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 591, 621 (2003). Cochran
suggests that in reality, however, "clients and client agents do not present unambiguous stories of
injustice ... or unconscionabilty," making a lawyer's determination as to what is "morally unworthy" a
much more difficult question. Id.
336. Luban's exploration of statutes of limitations in LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL
STUDY, supra note 332, makes this clear. Luban explores the 1957 case of Zabella v. Pakel, 242 F.2d
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base his approach to the issue in contextual judgment-that is, the view
that a lawyer should scrutinize the purposes of the law in question before
seeking its application-but, ultimately, would agree with the counsel
given.3 37 While Simon does not explicitly appeal to morality, as Luban
does, there seems, in substance, little difference between the two
scholars' perspectives. 338 Indeed, Simon's approach may simply "cloak
the lawyer's moral judgment in legal jargon.
However their perspectives are categorized, both Luban and Simon
reject hired-gun lawyering, recognize the potential impropriety of
pleading the statutes of limitations defense even under circumstances
when it would be legally acceptable, and appreciate the permissibility of
non-legal and moral client counseling.
Law Professor Peter Margulies rejects the hired gun approach with
even greater vigor, arguing that ethics rules should, indeed, require
lawyers to engage in non-legal and moral counseling of the sort that
340
would suggest a client forgo the statutes of limitations defense.
Margulies proposes a regime of ethics rules demanding that a lawyer
advise his or her client to alter the client's decision or proposed action if,
among other reasons:
* "The action or decision will harm others;"
" "The action or decision violates the norm of equality of all persons;"
* "The action or decision is one that the client would not wish for
everyone in society;"
" "The action or decision may engender guilt;"
" "The action or decision will harm others in a way that ultimately
will require a remedy from society at large;"
452 (7th Cir. 1957), which he describes as "concem[ing] a wealthy man attempting to evade a five
thousand dollar debt to an 'old friend, countryman and former employee' by pleading the statute of
limitations." LUBAN, supra note 332, at 9 (quoting Zabella, 242 F.2d at 455). Pressing the statutes of
limitation defense, under these circumstances, would, in Luban's view, be immoral. See id. at 47-48.
337. WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS 31-33
(1998). Simon utilizes a hypothetical similar to the one Luban employs, see LUBAN, supra note 332, at
9, in questioning the application of statutes of limitations. See SIMON, supra, at 29, 31-33.
338. Rakesh K. Anand, Toward an Interpretive Theory of Legal Ethics, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 653,
657 (2006) ("Luban's common morality approach and Simon's contextual judgment approach share
common ground. In fact, their approaches are largely two sides of the same coin (if not quite the same
argument)."); Mitchell M. Simon, Navigating Troubled Waters: Dealing With Personal Values When
Representing Others, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 415,421 n.30 (2005).
339. Symposium: Client Counseling and Moral Responsibility, supra note 335, at 594 n.13.
"Under Simon's model, the lawyer looks to the values underlying the law to resolve moral issues[,
which] ... clearly leaves the lawyer in charge of the moral issues that arise in legal representation." Id.
at 594.
340. Peter Margulies, "Who Are You to Tell Me That?": Attorney-Client Deliberation Regarding
Nonlegal Issues and the Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C. L. REv. 213, 215-21 (1990).
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in a net cost to society if all
- "The action or decision will result
34 1
individuals behave in a like manner."
So, while Hoeflich suggests that few if any contemporary lawyers
would respond to the above 'destitute widow' hypothetical as their
predecessors did,342 this divergence would, again, seem more a
consequence of the aforementioned market forces than of any rule-based
prohibition,3 43 and would seem to run against the great weight of the

literature on the subject.3 "

341. Id. at 221.
342. Hoeflich, supra note 319, at 40.
343. Hoeflich suggests that, under the KANSAS RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2007), available at
http://www.kscourts.org/rules/Rule-List.asp?rl =Rules+Relating+to+Discipline+of+Attomeys,
counseling a client against pleading a statute of limitations defense would "almost certainly be a
violation of Rules 1.1, 1.3 and 1.4." Hoeflich, supra note 319, at 40. It is difficult, however, to see how
this is so. The rules Hoeflich cites read as follows:
Rule 1.1 Client-Lawyer Relationship: Competence
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation
requires the knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.
Rule 1.3 Client-Lawyer Relationship: Diligence
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.
Rule 1.4 Client-Lawyer Relationship: Communication
a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and
promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client
to make informed decisions regarding the representation.
1, 1.3, 1.4 (2007), available at http://www.kscourts.org/rules/
KANSAS RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. I.
Rule-List.asp?rl =Rules+Relating+to+Discipline+of+Attomeys.
None of these rules seemingly would, on their face, bar an attorney from counseling a client
to forgo pleading a statute of limitations defense. While Kansas courts have sanctioned lawyers under
KANSAS RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.1, 1.3, 1.4 for mismanaging statutes of limitations, see, e.g., In
re Daniels, 159 P.3d 995 (Kan. 2007); In re Watson, 121 P.3d 982 (Kan. 2005); In re Coggs, 14 P.3d
1123 (Kan. 2000), the mere act of advising a client against pressing the statutes of limitations argument
would seem non-sanctionable.
In that KANSAS RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 and 1.3 mirror MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.1 and 1.3 and that KANSAS RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 does not substantively
differ from MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4, it seems clear that counseling a client against
pleading a statute of limitations defense would be no more violative of the MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT than it would be of the KANSAS RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT. Indeed, on the issue of
competence at least, Gantt argues, quite to the contrary, that MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1
"implies that lawyers may be required to discuss moral considerations with their clients," and as
discussed, questions concerning the application of statutes of limitations certainly involve moral
considerations. Gantt, supra note 322, at 266.
344. The great weight of the literature is, of course, not without exception. See, e.g., Anand,
supra note 338, at 653 (recognizing that Luban's and Simon's perspectives represent the "most powerful
contemporary thinking" on an attorney's moral obligations, but offering what he describes as "the
definitive response" to that literature in arguing that, among other things, "a lawyer's professional
responsibility ...[may] requir[e] him or her to assert the statute of limitations to frustrate a plaintiff's
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Perhaps then, considering long-standing, indeed foundational,
concerns as to the ethical propriety of the statutes of limitations defense
and the continued resonance of those concerns, defense lawyers faced
not with a 'destitute widow,' but with a 'destitute retiree'-an
impoverished elderly African-American who brings suit because she
was decades ago discriminated against by the lawyer's client such that
the destitute retiree is denied the pension her Caucasian former coworkers are receiving-might do what their predecessors' response to
the 'destitute widow' hypothetical suggests they would have done. That
is to say, if, indeed, the lawyers embrace their role as guardian of a
profession in which one is admonished to not "[p]rotect the oppressor in
his wrong: [n]or wrest the spirit of the laws, [t]o sanctify the villain's
cause[,]y 345 and are obliged to consider advising their client to abandon a
defense that "ought not ... be sustained ' 346 even if the letter of the law
would permit it, those lawyers might reasonably counsel their clients to
not mount a statutes of limitations defense against the destitute retiree's
claim. Lawyers seeking contemporary grounding for their advice could
turn to Luban, Simon and any number of the Margulies factors. Even if
wary of following these scholars, lawyers could confidently rely upon,
among other sources, Model Rule 2.1, the ABA's Lawyers' Manual on
Professional Conduct, and the American Law Institute's Restatement of
the Law Governing Lawyers.
The 'destitute retiree' claim, discussed in the above paragraph, is, of
course, the paradigmatic Jethroe claim. Although a lawyer defending an
employer against a Jethroe claim may argue against broaching moral
considerations in the belief that doing so would inappropriately broaden
the attorney's role to the client's detriment, 347 in fact, "[a] lawyer who
offers moral advice is no more compromising client autonomy than one
who offers purely legal advice ....
[A] lawyer who thinks about such
concerns but does not discuss them may, perhaps even unconsciously,
manipulate his client's actions
more problematically than a lawyer who
348
fosters an open dialogue."
Defense lawyers, therefore, who recognize the importance of justice
even at the expense of finality, should, in defending Jethroe claims,
consider counseling their clients against pleading a statute of limitations
violation.
Such counsel does not violate the profession's ethical

'just' claim").
345. Krauss, supra note 306, at 333, 334 (quoting GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 75-76 (T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1854)).

346. HOFFMAN, supra note 317, at 754 (emphasis added).
347. See SIMON, supra note 337, at 420.

348. Gantt, supra note 322, at 239-40.
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standards; indeed, the standards may be reasonably viewed as
encouraging it.
V. CONCLUSION

In recent decades, legal scholars, practitioners, and members of the
broader American community have debated the wisdom, reasonability,
and practicality of remedying injuries inflicted upon African-Americans
during our nation's troubled history of racial discrimination and
disenfranchisement. And as the debate has raged, many of those most
acutely impacted by the discrimination and disenfranchisement-the
African-Americans who suffered through the Jim Crow era, such as Sam
Jethroe-have grown old and died, having never reaped justice. Justice,
however, remains a possibility for scores of African-American retirees
through the prosecution of Jethroe claims.
As detailed in this Article, Jethroe claims are actionable under Section
1981, do not fall victim to traditional anti-reparations arguments, and
potentially avoid statutes of limitations dismissal by way of common
law tolling and accrual doctrine. Even if statutes of limitations would
otherwise apply: (1) legislators may, and should, ensure that Jethroe
claims are heard on the merits through legislating per se exceptions to
statutes of limitations in the Jethroe claim context; and (2) in the absence
of per se exceptions, defense lawyers may, and should, counsel their
clients against prevailing upon statutes of limitations in defending
Jethroe claims.
Jethroe claims carry with them the potential to provide some
semblance of justice to scores of African-American retirees and, in
doing so, to, by whatever increment, heal this nation's racial wound.
Their extinguishment "in consequence of the lapse of time," 349 would,
therefore, be tragic.

349. Holmes, supra note 135, at 476.

